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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/App 
v. 
M I C H A E L RENE DITTMER, 
Defendant/Appel lant 
Priorit 
Case No. 980169-CA 
B fl I E F O F I P PEL I E E 
JURISDICTION A N D N A T U R E OF P R O C E E D I N G S 
This is an appeal Imui u m \ iiniinr. Im huigLus. <i IIIIIMI degree1 fiinih ii! ml iimn 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995); Theft, a class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-41 I I I yw> I, possessioi i • : f a coi ltrolled si lbstai ice, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996); and possession of 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanoi ii: :t 'iolatioi I :)f I Jtal I Code « \ i in: i § 58 37 A,-5( 1) 
(1996). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
11 Di dlli tii i a l :• cin insel ef f e i;:tii \ ;elj • i ep i esent defendant : 
Defendant 's claim of ineffective assistance is raised for the first t ime on appeal; 
therefore, Ihc I ourl r e s o l d lln "*.." llt\^ MMIIII1 iMm "' ' . i / / . i P n t ( \ MI IM p .^j '!S<)9 
264 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). However, appellate 
review of counsel 's performance iiiml l-i I * LI X L iciili ml « tlicrvu. c, (In ih^t«»rting 
effects of hindsight' would produce too great a temptation for courts to second-guess trial 
counsel's performance on the basis of an inanimate record." State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 
590, 593 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). 
In claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient, in that it "'fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.'" Price, 909 P.2d at 264 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 688 (1984)). "[Defendant must also show that trial counsel's performance was 
prejudicial by proffering sufficient evidence demonstrating 'a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). If it is easier to dispose of claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel on this second, prejudice prong, the Court may do so 
without reaching the adequacy of trial counsel's performance. Id. 
2. Was the prosecutor's conduct proper? 
In determining whether a prosecutor's remarks are improper and erroneous, an 
appellate court considers whether the remarks "called to the jurors' attention matters 
which they wold not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict." State v. Palmer, 
860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App.) (quotation omitted), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 
1993). "Failure to object to the improper remarks, however, waives the claim unless the 
remarks reach the level of plain error." Id. Plain error is established only if an error 
exists, it should have been obvious to the trial court, and it was also harmful. Id. An 
error is harmful only if there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome 
would have been more favorable. Id. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . 
the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI. 
• . Aii\ ulliei n In ' nil u»i! ililiilLiiu.il |uth isioii, sl.ilul m ink i- i ilnl is pnlmi'iill ini 
the body of the brief. 
! »ll A I FIMIN I Ul' I  I  I II", "I ASE • 
Defendant was charged with burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. \ '< iv^ L1" l IlJIJ >» il|h I1. ,i i U * H niiMkiik\Hi'> xuAA^^n "f l 'lib Cink 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995); possession of controlled substance (marijuana), in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §58-3 7-8 (1996); ai id possession of dr ug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37A-5(l) (1996) (R. 1-5). Following 
a jury trial conducted 
104-07). The trial court imposed the statutory term of from zero-to-five years for the 
felony offense and the stati itoi > tei i i l c f si: <»: i i IOI it'll: is for eacl: I :::)f the n: lisdei i: leai lor offenses, 
all terms to be served concurrently (R. 114-15). 
Si VI f Ml P\l I  I'll1 I  III II1 "Ml I  S ' . 
The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn, 
850 IJ. 1 d 1 J ' 11 1 1 1 1 ' ' i ' » 11" 'I I 11 1 "l' i i"'" " ^ M i " 11 ' I ' " ' ' -1 s< l',J| 11.»»I v \ u«r^ , H k 11 n I 1 i 
storage shed located at Mollerup Storage in Riverdale, Utah (R. 128: 56-57).1 Nicole 
^ h e transcript volumes only are stamped with a record number, R. 128 and R. 
129, respectively, and the internal pages are not; therefore, citation to the transcript will 
be first to the pertinent record volume and then to the to the specific transcript page. 
3 
kept in the shed, including a couch, bed frame, and day planner (R. 128: 58-64). While 
Nicole was at the shed she noticed that all of her things were intact, and that nothing was 
missing (R. 128: 63). Nicole carefully locked the shed and checked to make sure it was 
secure when she left (R. 128: 60-61). Nicole was current on her rent to Mollerup and 
there was no reason that Mollerup would have "tampered" with her storage shed (R. 128: 
67,119). 
At approximately 5:45 p.m. on 29 March 1998, Solomon Le Doux, arrived at 
Mollerup Storage to check on his own storage sheds as they had been burgled one week 
earlier (R. 129: 5; R. 128: 3-4,12). Le Doux had been overdue on his rent to Mollerup 
in the past (R. 128: 9). It was his experience that when rent was overdue, Mollerup put a 
lock on the storage shed until the rent was paid (R. 128: 9).2 
Upon arriving at Mollerup on 29 March 1998, Le Doux saw defendant and 
codefendant going through the storage sheds (R. 128: 4). Defendant appeared "anxious" 
and was keeping "lookout" while codefendant removed items from the sheds and placed 
them in an old green truck (R. 128: 5). In particular, Le Doux noticed that a couch had 
been pulled out of one of the storage sheds (R. 128: 6-7). Suspicious about this activity, 
Le Doux called the police (R. 128: 18). 
Officer Hackworth of the Roy City Police Department, arrived to investigate 
approximately 15 minutes later at 6:00 p.m. (R. 128: 18). The officer approached and 
2Tracy Timmons, a secretary at Mollerup Storage clarified that if a customer gets 
behind in rent by four months, Mollerup's policy is to notify the customer that they will 
be locked out of their storage shed (R. 128: 119). If the customer does not respond to the 
lockout notice, they are sent a "sales" letter (id.). If the customer does not respond to this 
second notice, the case is referred to the manager (id.). 
4 
spoke to defendant who was standing next to a green pickup truck that was completely 
loaded with property; and ' "L i" ' i1 "v I « i null >\\A\I\ ' " l l ,n , i i n l ''< ' '^  "^ i- '! " 
Officer Hackworth asked defendant if the truck belonged to him and defendant responded 
affirmatively (R, UK J" I I I lie MIIILM IIIIIIIU iiiquiivd ill defendaiil was alone i ill 
someone was with him, and defendant said that he was with codefendant (R. 128: 23). 
Officer Hackworth asked for defendan 
falsely replied that his name was Mike Bradshaw and that his birthdate was 10 April 1964 
Mollerup and defendant claimed that he did and showed the officer storage shed #665 (R. 
128: 25). At this time, Officer Hackv 'oi (:t 1 1 loticed codefei iclant coi i lii :ig oi it of ai lotl iei 
storage shed approximately five units away, carrying an armful of books. The officer 
ordered codefendant out of the shed and, Un saleh reasons, a,ska! ' '"'i i "' L ;• 
outside the storage building while waiting for a backup officer to arrive (R. 128: 30). 
While waiting for assistance, Office i ; . •:. V ±r * 
if they had been going through storage sheds which were rented by other individuals. 
Defendant answered ihat ihe\ had been going through ""IIIIIIH kctl111 sn>iage sheds luokmg 
for items to sell at a swap meet (R. 128: Officer Hackworth asked defendant what 
they had found, and codefendant respo 1:1 :t€ y 1 lad fo^ n id a coi id l, a vv as! ling 
machine and a camper shell (R. 128: 34). Defendant added that the washing machine 
and camper shell wcie inside In1. SUH age \\ivd i hi). 
Officer Stephens arrived to assist at about this time (id). Officer Hackworth 
continued speaking 
35). Defendant said that he had been there three or four different times that day (id). 
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Officer Hackworth also asked where the property inside of defendant's truck had come 
from (R. 128: 37). Defendant said it had been inside his truck for days, and that 
everything in the back of the truck belonged to him (R. 128: 37, 39, 79-80). 
During the conversation, Officer Hackworth was also attempting to confirm 
defendant's name and date of birth (R. 128: 35). The officer informed defendant he had 
not been able to find a record of his driver's license under the name and birthdate 
defendant had provided and asked whether defendant in fact had a Utah driver's license 
(id). Defendant said that he did, and that it should have shown up on the computer (R. 
128: 36). Officer Hackworth told defendant that he did not feel defendant was giving 
him correct information and defendant then revealed his correct name, Michael Rene 
Dittmer, and his correct date of birth, 10 April 1961 (id.). 
At this point, Lynette Talbot drove up and told the officers that she was looking for 
her missing blue camper shell (R. 128: 38-39). Officer Stevens asked defendant if he had 
a blue aluminum camper shell and defendant in turn inquired whether the officers wanted 
to see the camper shell in his storage unit (R. 128: 38). Defendant then opened his 
claimed storage shed and Talbot's missing camper shell and a washing machine were 
inside (R. 128: 39). 
Officer Hackworth asked if there was anything in the back of defendant's truck 
which he had picked up from the storage sheds that day (R. 128: 38). Defendant 
reiterated that "everything in the truck was his" (R. 128: 40). Defendant also volunteered 
to let the officers look inside his truck and opened back of the truck for their inspection 
(R. 128: 40, 49-50, 85, 151). As he did so, a day planner belonging to Nicole Ayers fell 
out of the truck (R. 128: 86). Defendant claimed to have found the day planner in one of 
6 
the empty storage sheds (R. 128: 87). This was the first time that defendant disclaimed 
any of the property located inside his truck (id). 
Nicole subsequently arrived at the scene and identified the day planner, a bed 
frame inside the truck and the couch on top of the truck as hers (R. 128: 89). Nicole also 
noted that several other items were missing from her storage shed (id.). Following 
Nicole's identification of the property, defendant and codefendant were placed under 
arrest (R. 128: 90). 
Pursuant to policy, the officers conducted an impound/inventory search of 
defendant's truck (R. 128: 91,95). The property was removed from defendant's truck 
and placed in piles for identification purposes (R. 128: 92). After photographing the 
recovered property, Nicole was allowed to retrieve that portion of her property that was 
not booked into evidence (R. 128: 97). The rest of the property was returned to 
defendant's truck since police had identified no other owners and knew only that 
defendant claimed the property was his (id.). 
An inventory of the cab area of defendant's truck revealed on the seat in plain 
view, a "hype kit" (R. 128: 44, 94).3 Upon discovering the "hype kit," Officer Stevens 
walked over to Officer Hackworth's patrol car and showed it to him (R. 128: 44, 96). 
Defendant was sitting inside (id.). Shortly thereafter, Officer Hackworth departed for the 
jail with defendant and defendant volunteered that the "hype kit" was his and that he had 
a drug problem (R. 128: 44). 
3A "hype kit" consists of equipment frequently used to mix drugs for intravenous 
use(R. 128: 95). 
7 
Officer Hackworth also searched defendant's person and found marijuana in his 
right front pocket (id). 
Defendant was questioned at the station house by Detective Bryson (R. 128: 124-
25). Detective Bryson gave defendant his Miranda4 rights and defendant agreed to speak 
with her (id.). Defendant admitted going into unlocked storage sheds at Mollerup and 
taking property (R. 128: 126). He claimed that he thought the property was going to be 
hauled off to the garbage (id.). When the detective asked him if he really thought the 
washing machine was junk, defendant admitted that Min his heart he knew it was wrong to 
take it and that he should return it" (R. 128: 129). 
Defendant testified in his own defense (R. 128: 141-161) (a complete copy of 
defendant's testimony is contained in addendum A). He claimed that upon arriving at 
Mollerup on 29 March 1998, he noticed stuff all over the place and several open storage 
sheds (R. 128: 144). He decided to take anything he could sell for a quarter or more at 
the swap meet (R. 128: 145). He also planned to give some of the property to 
codefendant (id.). Defendant claimed that while the couch was "pretty nice," he thought 
the rest of the items would be thrown in the dumpster and were therefore "up for grabs" 
(R. 128: 146-152). He returned later in the day with codefendant to get the couch he had 
noticed earlier (R. 128: 147). Defendant explained that he gave Officer Hackworth a 
false name because he was worried that there might be a DUI warrant out for him (R. 
128: 150). He admitted telling the officer that most of the property in the truck belonged 
to him and acknowledged that he consented to let the officers search in the back of his 
truck (R. 128: 151). On cross examination, defendant admitted that the hype kit 
4See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966). 
8 
belonged to him and that it could be used to ingest methamphetamine and cocaine (R. 
128: 152-153). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant raises multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 
however, the claims are largely undeveloped and otherwise inadequate under the briefing 
rule. They should be rejected on these grounds. To the extent the Court may deem the 
claims sufficient for appellate review, defendant demonstrates no obvious deficiency on 
the part of trial counsel, let alone consequent prejudice. 
Point II. Defendant raises approximately four claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 
These claims are inadequately briefed and can be rejected on this ground. Even if the 
Court deems defendant's largely undeveloped claims sufficient for appellate review, he 
fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor drew the jury's attention to matters they were 
unjustified in considering. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 
A. Defendant's Heavy Burden to Demonstrate Ineffective Assistance 
In challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel, it is defendant's burden to 
establish that counsel's performance both "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness;" and also prejudiced the outcome below. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 
814 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
Defendant cannot show trial counsel's performance was deficient without pointing to 
specific instances of inadequacy. Id. Moreover, because the Court will not second guess 
9 
trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, defendant must overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, defendant must establish that 
there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
below would have been different. Id. If the Court can dispose of an allegation of 
ineffectiveness on the ground that no prejudice is shown, it will do so without addressing 
the adequacy of trial counsel's performance. Id. 
In addition to these substantive requirements, there is a threshold requirement that 
defendant must meet before his ineffective assistance claim may be considered for the 
first time on direct appeal: He must provide a record adequate to permit decision of his 
claims. State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 
1993). A trial record is adequate only if the Court is unaware of any evidence or 
arguments which might be made and which are not before it. Id. 
B. Pre-trial Investigation 
In Point 1(A) of his brief, defendant broadly asserts that trial counsel failed to 
investigate the possibility of any third party culpability in the Mollerup Storage 
burglaries. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. In Point 1(D) of his brief, defendant further speculates that 
trial counsel should have investigated an unnamed individual who rented a storage shed 
next to Solomon Le Doux, and also that trial counsel should have investigated Lynette 
Talbot, the individual who claimed ownership of the camper shell retrieved from 
defendant's storage shed. Aplt. Br. at 34-36. Inadequate investigation is a basis for 
demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 264 (Utah 
App. 1995), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). The Court should not reach this 
10 
issue, however, because defendant has not developed a record to support his claims of 
inadequate investigation. 
1. Inadequate Record 
"Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and 
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record.1' State v. Wetzel, 868 
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). "Thus, the appellant has the burden of providing the reviewing 
court with an adequate record on appeal to prove his allegations." Call v. City of West 
Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) 
{citing Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989)); accord State v. 
Wulfenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). Rule 
23 B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides an opportunity to develop a record for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. Garrett, 849 P.2d at 581. 
Defendant, however, has not availed himself of this procedure. He therefore fails to 
provide a record upon which this Court may consider his claims of deficient investigation 
on direct appeal. Absent an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing court will 
necessarily assume the regularity of the proceedings below. Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 
1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033 (1990); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 
688, 699 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah Feb. 6, 1996). The Court 
should do so here. There is no indication in the available record that trial counsel did not 
investigate the unnamed woman, Talbot, or any other possibility of third party culpability, 
or, that the investigation would have been fruitful. 
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2. No Prejudice 
In any event, defendant's claims fail to meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland 
standard and can be rejected on this ground as well. Defendant cannot establish prejudice 
"simply by identifying unexplored avenues of investigation. Rather, he must demonstrate 
a reasonable probability that further investigation would have yielded sufficient 
information to alter the outcome of his [trial]." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523-24 
(Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). Here, there was some evidence that Mollerup 
had been recently burgled (R. 128: 6, 131). Assuming there was admissible evidence 
that a third party burgled Mollerup as recently as 29 March 1998, that evidence would 
only go to the unlawful entry of the storage sheds, conduct defendant did not deny (R. 
128: 145-47), see add. A. If defendant had denied that he ever entered the storage sheds 
on 29 March 1998, it might be relevant that a third party had done so. 
To the contrary, defendant has always maintained that he entered the storage sheds 
and removed property he hoped to sell at the swap meet (R. 128: 145, 152), see add. A. 
Asserting that he believed the property was abandoned or otherwise "dumpster" quality, 
defendant suggests only that he lacked the requisite mental state for burglary. Aplt. Br. at 
26. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995) ("A person is guilty of burglary if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a 
felony or theft"). It is a defense to theft that the actor "[o]btained or exercised control 
over the property or service honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have 
consented." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1995). However, whether someone else 
unlawfully entered the storage sheds is irrelevant to this defense. Accordingly, defendant 
fails to demonstrate any prejudice due to the alleged lack of third party culpability 
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evidence. See State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1240 (Utah App. 1995) (M[t]rial counsel's 
decision regarding the proper allocation of pretrial resources is normally a tactical 
decision, which this court will not overturn absent, a showing of unreasonableness or 
prejudice"). 
C. Defendant's Statements 
In Point 1(B) of his brief, defendant asserts that trial counsel performed deficiently 
in not moving to suppress his statement that everything in the truck belonged to him, and 
also his statements claiming ownership of the "hype kit," and admitting that he had a drug 
problem. Aplt. Br. at 29, 31-32.5 Defendant provides no meaningful analysis of the 
record or pertinent authority demonstrating that these statements were obtained pursuant 
to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda. His claims of ineffective assistance 
should therefore be rejected. 
1. Inadequate Briefing 
Whenever an accused is subjected to custodial interrogation, he must be given the 
benefit of a Miranda warning. State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 545 (Utah App. 1997); State 
v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831, 834 (Utah App. 1995). One is in custody for purposes of 
Miranda when his "freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal 
arrest" State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1996) (additional quotations 
5There are number of nominal allusions in defendant's brief to other potential 
issues which are not included in the heading to defendant's Point 1(B). For example, 
defendant suggests that his consent to search was coerced, and that the inventory search 
was invalid. Aplt. Br. at 29-31. The State does not respond to these undeveloped 
comments. See State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 346 n.4 (Utah App.) (declining to reach 
state constitutional claim which was "not developed to any meaningful extent"), cert, 
denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). See also authority in subpart 1(C)(1), supra. 
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omitted); Yoder, 935 P.2d at 545. Whether a person who has not been formally arrested 
is ,fin custody" for Miranda purposes "depends on an objective assessment of the 
circumstances of the interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the 
interrogation rather than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting 
the examination." Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147. 
The custody determination is aided by review of five factors: "(1) the site of 
interrogation; (2) whether the interrogation focused on the accused; (3) whether the 
objective indicia of arrest were present; [] (4) the length and form of interrogation [;]", id. 
and "(5) whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and willingly." 
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 
943 (Utah 1993); see also Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). 
Here, defendant claims that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without 
benefit of Miranda warnings. Aplt. Br. at 28-32. He wholly fails, however, to analyze 
the facts of this case under the pertinent custody factors set forth above. Id. Indeed, 
regarding defendant's statement claiming ownership of the property in the back of his 
truck, defendant makes no argument that the length and form of the on-the-scene 
questioning compels a conclusion of custody, that there were any indicia of arrest, or that 
there was any articulated focus on him as a suspect. Aplt. Br. at 28-32. 
As for defendant's statements claiming ownership of the "hype kit" and 
acknowledging his drug problem, these statements were volunteered following 
defendant's arrest and after he had been handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. The State 
does not therefore dispute that defendant was in custody at the time. However, defendant 
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fails to provide any meaningful analysis or case authority demonstrating that his 
statements were improperly elicited through interrogation. Aplt. Br. at 29, 31-32. 
Defendant's failures to provide meaningful analysis of the facts and authority 
pertinent to the claimed Miranda violations is reason enough to dismiss his claims of 
ineffective assistance. See, e.g., State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah 
App. 1996); State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 1100 n.3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 
913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 n.3 (Utah App. 1994); 
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.2 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1992); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248-50 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 
1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604, 613 (Utah App. 1991); State 
v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Pascoe, 11A P.2d 512, 514 
n.l (Utah App. 1989). 
2. No Obviously Deficient Performance 
To the extent defendant's cursory allegations are deemed sufficient for appellate 
review, he cannot show that he was so obviously subjected to custodial interrogation 
without benefit of Miranda warnings, that trial counsel performed deficiently in not 
moving to suppress his statements. See State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 
1994) (suggesting that obvious prong of plain error analysis applies to claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel), overruled on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). 
Turning first to defendant's statement claiming ownership of the property in the 
back of the truck, this statement was elicited at the scene while the officers were still 
gathering information about the suspected burglary {see R. 128: 37-39, 79-80) (copies of 
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the pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum B). This initial questioning was 
brief and investigatory in nature. Under this circumstance of "[g]eneral on-the-scene 
questioning as to facts surrounding the crime or other general questioning of citizens in 
the factfinding process . . . the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-
custody interrogation is not necessarily present." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 477 
(1966). See also Mincy, 838 P.2d at 653 ("If the questioning is merely investigatory, 
courts have not found custody."). Even if the questioning itself turned from investigatory 
to accusatory by the time the officers inquired about the property inside defendant's truck, 
this factor would not alone render the situation custodial. Id. ("The change from 
investigatory to accusatory questioning occurs when the 'police have reasonable grounds 
to believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to believe that the 
defendant committed it.'"). 
While two officers were present at the time the statement was made, see Statement 
of Facts at p. 6-7, infra, the scene at Mollerup Storage cannot fairly be described as police 
dominated. See People v. Robbins, 654 N.Y.S.2d 494, 494 (App. div. 1997) (finding 
police dominated atmosphere where stationhouse interview was conducted with at least 
seven different officers questioning defendant in teams of two or more); People v. 
Bookless, 502 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (App. div. 1986) (finding scene was police dominated 
where four to six officers were present at the time defendant was questioned while sitting 
inside locked patrol car). This is particularly true where codefendant, as well as Lynette 
Talbot, Nicole Ayers and other potential witnesses were variously present {see R. 128: 
37-39, 42-43, 51, 65-71, 82-84, 89-90, 126). See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 457 P.2d 613, 
614 (Utah 1969) (deeming it significant that home interview was conducted in presence 
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of suspect's wife and friend). Moreover, courts are unlikely to find questioning to be 
custodial when conducted "in a place of public accommodation," like Mollerup Storage. 
See W. LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 6.6 p. 496 n. 51 (1984) (collecting authority). 
Finally, the officers used no coercive or compulsive stratagem in questioning 
defendant and codefendant about their purpose and presence at the scene. See 
Straus berg, 895 P.2d at 835 n.5 ("The absence of coercive or compulsive strategy on the 
officer's part evidences a noncustodial interrogation that does not suggest the type of 
abuse Miranda is intended to prevent") (citations omitted). There were no indicia of 
arrest, which typically include "readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns." State v. 
Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). Nor did the officers express any 
intent to arrest defendant or codefendant. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148 (clarifying that an 
officer's unarticulated, subjective focus on a particular suspect is irrelevant to the 
determination of whether the suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes). 
In any event, even if improperly obtained, defendant's statement claiming that 
property inside the truck belonged to him is not necessarily inconsistent with the defense 
strategy that defendant believed the property he was taking from the storage sheds was 
junk on its way to the dumpster (R. 128: 152), see add. A. See also Aplt. Br. at 26. 
Moreover, on direct examination by trial counsel, defendant further explained his 
statement: 
Counsel: Did you ever tell [the officer] it was all your 
property? 
Defendant: After - after the lady had gotten there, or at the time 
that they had - yeah, they did ask me if it was all my 
property. And I said - I said well, I would have to 
look in there. There may be some little bits of stuff. I 
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said but I would have to look in there and go through it 
to be positively sure. But, yes, I said most of that stuff 
was mine. 
(R. 151), see add. A. Defendant has not included in the record on appeal, trial counsel's 
closing argument. Therefore, on this record, defendant fails to show that trial counsel 
lacked any strategic purpose in not objecting to the admission of the statement. Strain, 
885 P.2d at 814; Garrett, 849 P.2d at 580; Wulfenstein, 657 P.2d at 293. 
Turning next to defendant's statements claiming ownership of the "hype kit," and 
also acknowledging his drug problem, as noted previously, the State does not dispute that 
defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes at the time he made these statements, see 
Statement of the Facts at pp. 7-8, infra. However, defendant fails to demonstrate that 
these statements were elicited through interrogation. See Aplt. Br. at 29, 31. Officer 
Stevens showed the "hype kit" to Officer Hackworth in defendant's presence (see R. 128: 
44, 96). Shortly thereafter, Officer Hackworth took defendant to jail, and defendant 
volunteered to Officer Hackworth that the "hype kit" belonged to him and that he had a 
drug problem (id.). Volunteered statements are not barred by Miranda. Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 478 ("Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment 
and their admissibility is not affect by our holding today"). 
Based on the above, there is no obvious Miranda violation such that trial counsel 
can be said to have performed deficiently in not moving to suppress defendant's 
statements claiming ownership of property in the truck, the hype kit, and acknowledging 
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his drug problem. Labrum, 881 P.2d at 906. Even if defendant was in custody at the time 
he claimed ownership of the property in his truck, defendant fails to show that admission 
of his statement lacked any strategic value. Strain, 885 P.2d at 814; Garrett, 849 P.2d at 
580. Defendant thus fails to establish any obviously deficient performance on the part of 
trial counsel and his claims of such should be rejected. 
3. No Prejudice 
Even if, on this record, trial counsel can be said to have performed deficiently in 
not moving to suppress defendant's statements, defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice. 
Strain, 885 P.2d at 814 (Utah App. 1994). The evidence against defendant was 
overwhelming. For example, the record is devoid of indication that defendant or 
codefendant were authorized to enter or remove property from any storage shed other 
than defendant's, conduct which defendant did not deny (R. 128: 145-47), see add. A. 
Further, Solomon LeDoux observed defendant and codefendant removing items from the 
storage sheds and placing them in defendant's truck (R. 128: 4-8). Nicole Ayers also 
identified her couch on top of defendant's truck and her bedframe inside the truck (R. 
128: 66). Police also retrieved Nicole's day planner from the truck (R. 128: 39-41). 
Although defendant's defense strategy was to claim that he believed the property he took 
was junk, he also admitted that the couch was "pretty nice" (R. 128: 146), see add. A. 
Even if the record supported defendant's assertion that the other items of property he took 
were junk, and/or that a third party did the initial breaking and entering, defendant's 
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admitted looting is not a defense to burglary. Moreover, the Mhype kit" was found in 
defendant's truck and the drugs were found on his person (R. 128: 44, 94). Therefore, 
admission of evidence that defendant claimed ownership of the property and Mhype kifin 
his truck, and also admitted he had a drug problem, even if improper, was not 
prejudicially so. 
D. Defendant's Vre-Miranda, Pre-Arrest Silence 
Another issue of ineffective assistance only nominally alluded to in the body of 
defendant's Point 1(B) is the admissibility of his alleged prz-Miranda, pre-arrest silence. 
Defendant arguably attempts to develop this allusion by citing State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 
339 (Utah App.), cert denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993), for the proposition that a 
suspect's pxz-Miranda, pre-arrest silence is inadmissible. Aplt. Br. at 28-29. Defendant's 
reliance on Palmer is misplaced. Contrary to defendant's assertion, Palmer does not hold 
that it is impermissible to impeach a suspect with his/her pxz-Miranda, pre-arrest silence. 
Rather, as recognized in Palmer, it is a defendant's posi-Mirartda silence which cannot be 
used at trial. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 347 (citing Doyle v. United States, 426 U.S. 610 
(1976)). This is so because silence following the delivery of Miranda warnings, "could 
simply be an exercise of the these rights." Id. Palmer extends this reasoning to the 
situation where a suspect actually invokes his/her Miranda rights even before those rights 
have been delivered, and holds that evidence of the suspect's subsequent silence cannot 
therefore be used in the State's case-in-chief. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 349. Defendant does 
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not allege, nor is there indication in the record that he invoked his Miranda rights either 
before or after the rights were administered to him. Palmer therefore has no application 
on these facts. 
Defendant also identifies R. 128: 26, 31-33, see add. B, as the record cites where 
evidence of his pre-Miranda silence was allegedly admitted. However, no such evidence 
is admitted at R. 128: 26. As for evidence admitted at R. 128: 31-33, it shows that over 
trial counsel's objection, Officer Hackworth testified that codefendant answered a pre-
Miranda, pre-arrest question posed to defendant about what they had found in the storage 
sheds (R. 128: 31), see add. B. Moreover, trial counsel subsequently requested a mistrial 
claiming that the prosecutor had improperly adduced evidence of his pre-Miranda, pre-
arrest silence, which request was denied (R. 128: 99-103), see add. B. 
Defendant wholly fails to analyze these facts, including the significance of trial 
counsel's efforts to preclude this evidence and the trial court's rulings thereon. See Aplt. 
Br. at 27-32. Indeed, defendant makes no allegation of plain error in regards to the trial 
court's rulings. Id. Defendant comments only that he "chose to remain silent during 
much of the interview.M Aplt. Br. at 30. This terse statement constitutes the sum total of 
defendant's nominal analysis. Id. Such is inadequate under the briefing rule and should 
be rejected. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346 n. 4 and authority cited in subpart 1(C)(1), infra. 
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E. Le Doux's Testimony 
In Point 1(C) of his brief, defendant raises several claims of ineffective assistance 
in regard to the admissibility of Solomon Le Doux's testimony. Aplt. Br. at 32. This 
Court should not reach these claims because they are inadequately briefed and/or 
unsupported in the available record. 
1* Inadequate Briefing 
First, defendant complains there was insufficient foundation laid for Le Doux's 
testimony about Mollerup Storage's policy on overdue rent. Aplt. Br. at 32-33. Other 
than complain that Le Doux was not connected to Mollerup management, defendant fails 
to identify what foundation was lacking. Id. Indeed, upon review of the available 
record, there was no basis for an objection. See State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 
1982) ("Effective representation does not require counsel to object when doing so would 
be futile."). Le Doux did not claim to be part of Mollerup management, but rather 
testified based on his personal experience as a Mollerup customer. Specifically, Le Doux 
rented at Mollerup for approximately one year, during which time he was overdue on his 
rent (R. 128: 8-9) (copies of pertinent transcript pages are included in addendum C). As 
a result of his being overdue on rent, Mollerup placed an additional lock on Le Doux's 
storage unit, preventing his access thereto (id.). This testimony was elicited on voir dire 
by trial counsel below (id.). Le Doux did not offer any testimony with regard to 
Mollerup's policy on abandoned property (R. 128: 9), see add. C. Defendant provides no 
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meaningful analysis of his foundational challenge to LeDoux's testimony, let alone, any 
supporting authority. Aplt. Br. at 32. His claim of deficient performance is therefore 
inadequate under the briefing rule and should be rejected on that ground. See authority in 
Point 1(C)(1), infra. 
Second, defendant nominally complains that Le Doux's testimony was irrelevant 
under rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, and that it was more prejudicial than probative 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 33. His rule 401 claims consists of 
nothing more than a recitation of rule 401 and an unanalyzed assertion of irrelevancy. Id. 
Defendant's rule 403 claim consists of little more than the assertion that Le Doux's 
testimony allowed the jury to assume that Mollerup customers never abandoned their 
property, and that even if they did, Mollerup never left their storage units open. Id. 
Defendant's assertions in this regard grossly over construe Le Doux's testimony (see R. 
128: 8-9), see add. C, and defendant wholly fails to explain how the jury could otherwise 
arrive at these unsupported assumptions.6 Because these claims are unsupported in the 
record and case authority, they are similarly inadequate under the briefing rule and should 
be rejected. See authority in Point 1(C)(1), infra. 
6Mollerup Secretary, Tracy Timmons, testified regarding Mollerup's procedure in 
dealing with overdue rent, and in dealing with potentially abandoned property. See n.2 
infra. 
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2. Inadequate Record 
Defendant raises additional claims which the Court should not reach because he 
has failed to provide an adequate record. See authority in Point 1(A)(1). Defendant 
complains that trial counsel failed to call into question Le Doux's alleged inconsistent 
statements, and failed to argue that defendant made no effort to hide his activities from Le 
Doux. Aplt. Br. at 32, 34. However, defendant fails to explain what about Le Doux's 
testimony was inconsistent, nor has he included in the record on appeal trial counsel's 
closing argument. The record is therefore inadequate to determine what arguments trial 
counsel did or did not make regarding LeDoux's testimony. See authority in Point 
1(A)(1). 
Defendant also fails to support in the record his further suggestion that trial 
counsel failed to adequately investigate Mollerup Storage's policy and procedure 
regarding abandoned property. Aplt. Br. at 33. On this record, defendant cannot show 
that trial counsel did not investigate, or that the fruits of that investigation would have 
been favorable to his defense strategy. As noted previously, defendant has not availed 
himself of the opportunity to provide a supporting record under rule 23 B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See Point 1(B)(1), infra. The record is therefore inadequate to 
determine the merits, if any, of defendant's claim in this regard and it should also be 
rejected. Id. 
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F. Hodgepodge of Undeveloped Claims Relating to Trial Strategy 
The heading of defendant's Point 1(D), asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for resting without presenting defense witnesses, requiring defendant to request a re-
opening of the case in order to testify, which he consequently did. Aplt. Br. at 34. The 
body of the point, however, constitutes a hodgepodge of nominal references to, among 
other things, trial counsel's waiver of opening statement, and trial counsel's non-
objection to hearsay testimony that Talbot claimed ownership of the camper shell. Aplt. 
Br. at 34-35.7 Defendant's nominal and scattered second-guessing of trial counsel's 
strategy is wholly inadequate for appellate review. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346, n.4 and 
authority in Point 1(C)(1), infra. See also State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1154 (Utah App. 
1994) (refusing to "second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however 
flawed those choices might appear in retrospect"). Even assuming these nominal 
allusions suffice to demonstrate deficient performance, defendant does not even attempt 
to demonstrate, let alone establish, any consequent prejudice. See Aplt. Br. at 34-36. His 
claims of ineffective assistance should therefore be rejected, Strain, 885 P.2d at 814, and 
the State does not attempt to further parse defendant's nominal allegations. 
defendant's allegations that counsel performed deficiently in not calling as 
witnesses an unidentified woman present at Mollerup Storage on the day of the 
burglaries, and Lynnette Talbot, the owner of the camper shell, see Aplt. Br. at 34, are 
addressed in Point 1(B), infra. 
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G. Photographs of Property Found in Defendant's Truck and Storage 
Shed 
1. Inadequate Record 
In Point 1(E) of his brief, defendant complains that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object on foundational grounds to the admissibility of photographs of his truck, 
property recovered from his truck, and also property found in his storage shed. Aplt. Br. 
at 36-38. This Court should not reach this issue because defendant has not included the 
complained of photographs in the record on appeal.8 As set out in Point 1(A)(1), it is the 
appellant's responsibility to support an allegation of error with an adequate record. 
Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). Absent an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing 
court will necessarily assume the regularity of the proceedings below. Jolivet, 784 P.2d 
at 1150; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 699. 
2. Inadequate Briefing 
In any event, to the extent defendant complains that Exh. ## P-l, P-2, P-6, P-6, P-7 
and Exh. #15, were admitted without sufficient foundation, see Aplt. Br. at 36-37, his 
claim is unsupported in the available record.9 Adequate foundation to authenticate 
8,f[P]hysical exhibits other than documents are not transmitted by the clerk of the 
trial court unless directed to do so by a party or by the clerk of the appellate court. A 
party must make advance arrangement with the clerks for the transportation and receipt of 
exhibits of unusual bulk or weight." Utah R. App. P. 12(b)(4). 
9The State does not address defendant's nominal references to Exh. ## P-7, P-10 
and Exh. # 15 because defendant wholly fails to identify or discuss the content of these 
exhibits. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346 n.4. Defendant also suggests that photographs of the 
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photographs "may be laid by testimony which establishes that the evidence is what the 
proponent claims it to be." State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1985). Generally, 
"if a competent witness with personal knowledge of the facts represented by a photograph 
testifies that the photograph accurately reflects those facts, it is admissible." Id. Here, 
Nicole Ayers testified that Exh.# P-l was a photograph of her couch (R. 128: 61-62). 
Ayers further testified that Exh. # P-2 was a photograph of the box in which she had 
stored her day planner (R. 128: 64). Officers Hackworth and Stevens testified that Exh. 
# P-6 was a photograph of defendant's truck (R. 128: 20, 79). Finally, Officer Stevens 
testified that Exh. # P-10 was a photograph of property removed from defendant's truck 
which belonged to Ayers (R. 128: 92). Defendant cites no authority establishing that the 
above testimony is inadequate to authenticate the photographs. Aplt. Br. at 36-37. His 
claim is therefore inadequately briefed, see authority in Point 1(C)(1), and also fails to 
establish any obviously deficient performance, let alone prejudice. Labrum, 881 P.2d at 
906; Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 59; Strain, 885 P.2d at 814. 
Defendant also nominally complains about the admission of his statement 
acknowledging that he did not believe the washing machine was garbage, and that "in his 
heart he knew it was wrong to take it." Aplt. Br. at 38 (citing R. 128: 127-129) (copies 
washing machine and camper shell recovered from his storage shed were admitted, see 
Aplt. Br. at 37; however, defendant's claim is unsupported by citation to the record and 
the State is unable to discern on the available record that such pictures were in fact 
admitted. 
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of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum D. In challenging the 
admission of this uncharged conduct, defendant is attempting to raise a rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, issue.10 However, he wholly fails to cite to the rule, or otherwise 
demonstrate that the evidence was admitted solely for the purpose of demonstrating that 
he has a propensity for thefVburglary. See Aplt. Br. at 37-38. To the contrary, because 
defendant claimed to believe that the property he removed was garbage, defendant's 
admission that the washing machine was not junk was relevant and probative of his 
intent. State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 1978). As noted previously, trial counsel 
is not required to make futile objections. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 59. Defendant's 
undeveloped and nominal claim should be rejected. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346 n.4. 
H. Scope of Prosecutor's Cross-Examination 
In Point 1(F) of his brief, defendant complains that trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing to raise a "scope" objection to the prosecutor's cross-examination of him regarding 
the "hype kit" and marijuana which provided the basis for the drug charges. Aplt. Br. at 
'Rule 404(b) provides: 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence 
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character 
purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
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38-39. See also (R. 128: 152-154), see add. A. Defendant's direct testimony was limited 
to an explanation of his conduct in entering and removing property from storage sheds at 
Mollerup Storage on the date of the burglaries (R. 128: 141-152), see Add. A. Defendant 
complains that because he was not examined about the "hype kit" or the marijuana on 
direct, the prosecutor's cross-examination violated rule 104(d), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
That rule provides that an "accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, 
become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the case." Rule 104(a) further 
explains that preliminary matters constitute the "qualification of a person to be a witness, 
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence^]" Defendant's allegation of 
ineffective assistance is devoid of meaningful analysis or supporting legal authority 
demonstrating that his testimony on direct was limited to preliminary matters or that the 
prosecutor's cross-examination as to defendant's charged conduct in possessing both the 
"hype kit" and the marijuana was otherwise improper under rule 104(d). It should be 
rejected on this ground. See authority cited in Point 1(C)(1), infra. Even if his claim is 
deemed sufficient, defendant has not attempted to demonstrate, let alone establish, any 
consequent prejudice, and his claim should be rejected on this ground as well. Strain, 885 
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P.2d at 814.11 Notably, defendant raises no claim of prosecutorial misconduct in regards 
to this issue. 
I. Consensual Search of Defendant's Truck 
In Point 1(G) of his brief, defendant cites sundry Fourth Amendment authority and 
makes several nominal and undeveloped comments related to the Fourth Amendment 
activity of the investigating officers which the State does not therefore address. See Aplt. 
Br. at 39-40. See also Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346 n.4. If defendant is challenging the 
warrantless search of his truck, he wholly fails to recognize that he asked the officers if 
they wanted to look in his truck (R. 128: 40, 85, 151), see add. A, or to otherwise 
demonstrate that his consensual behavior was unknowing or involuntary. See Aplt. Br. at 
39-40. Consent to search is an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980); State v. ContreU 886 P.2d 
1
 defendant nominally comments in the body of Point 1(F) that trial counsel 
stipulated to his guilt on the above drug charges. Aplt. Br. at 39. If this is an additional 
claim of ineffective assistance, defendant has not attempted to demonstrate, let alone 
establish, any consequent prejudice. Strain, 885 P.2d at 814. Nor could he. The drugs 
and paraphernalia were recovered from defendant's person and his truck; therefore, there 
was no real defense to these charges below. Trial counsel may have hoped to increase 
credibility with the jury in his denial of the felony burglary charge, by admitting the 
misdemeanor drug charges. See State v. Baker, No. 911650-CA, slip op. at 9-10 (Utah 
App. July 30 1998) (recognizing that trial counsel is not required "to develop every 
conceivable defense that [is] available," particularly "where evidence on the issue weighs 
heavily in favor of the State and a decision to dispute the issue could negatively affect 
counsel's credibility with the fact-finder when asserting other, more viable defenses.") 
(citation omitted). This undeveloped claim should be rejected. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346 
n.4. 
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107 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). As noted previously, 
trial counsel is not required to make futile objections. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 59. 
Defendant's inadequately briefed claim fails to demonstrate any deficient performance, 
let alone prejudice, and should be rejected. See authority in Point 1(C)(1); Strain, 885 
P.2dat814. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT WAS PROPER 
A. Opening Statement 
In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant complains that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct in his opening statement by commenting on an instance of defendant's pre-
Miranda silence in alleged violation of State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993). 
The prosecutor stated that defendant showed police his own storage shed, but 
f,volunteer[ed] no other information to the officer at that time, other than the fact that 
that's my shedM (R. 129: 7) (a complete copy of the prosecutor's opening statement is 
contained in addendum E). In order to establish that this statement amounts to 
prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show that the prosecutor called to the juror's 
attention a matter they could not consider in reaching their verdict. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 
342; State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1993); State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 590 n.7 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 910 
P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). Having preserved no objection below, defendant must also show 
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that the prosecutor so clearly directed the jurors' attention to inappropriate matters that 
the trial court should have intervened on his behalf, and that the absence of a sua sponte 
intervention undermines confidence in the guilty verdict. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1223 (Utah 1993); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342 (holding that plainly erroneous 
prosecutorial misconduct requires error that is obvious and that undermines confidence in 
the outcome). However, defendant wholly fails to engage in any analysis demonstrating 
that the prosecutor's opening statement remark constitutes plain error. See Aplt. Br. at 
41-43. His claim of prosecutorial misconduct regarding the prosecutor's opening 
statement is therefore waived. State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). In any event, as set out in Point 
1(D), because no Palmer violation occurred on these facts, there was no impropriety in the 
prosecutor's comment. 
B. Direct Examination of Officer Hackworth 
Defendant also alleges in Point 11(A) of his brief, that the prosecutor acted 
improperly in questioning Officer Hackworth about defendant's pre-Miranda, pre-arrest 
silence in alleged violation of Palmer. Aplt. Br. at 41. Defendant complains that this 
questioning improperly brought out evidence that he remained silent during most of the 
questioning. Aplt. Br. at 41 (citing R. 128: 26, 31-33), see add. B.12 Trial counsel raised 
12As noted previously, no instance of defendant's pre-Miranda silence was 
admitted at R. 128: 26, see add. B. 
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an objection to the questioning, however, which was overruled (see R. 128: 31-34), see 
add. B. Moreover, as set out in Point 1(D), infra, no Palmer violation occurred on these 
facts. Defendant wholly fails to explain how, given the trial court's ruling below and the 
lack of a. Palmer violation, he can prevail on either his claim of ineffective assistance, see 
Point 1(D), infra, or his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. See Aplt. Br. at 41-43. 
Defendant's undeveloped claim does not suffice for appellate review. Palmer, 860 P.2d 
at 346 n.4. However, even if it did, given that there was no Palmer violation, he has not 
shown that the prosecutor's questioning of Officer Hackworth called the jurors' attention 
to matters they were unjustified in considering. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342; Cummins, 839 
P.2d at 852; Saunders, 893 P.2d at 590 n.7. His claim of prosecutorial misconduct should 
be rejected. 
C. Hearsay 
Defendant nominally alludes to a third instance of prosecutorial misconduct in 
Point 11(A) of his brief, complaining that the prosecutor erred in introducing hearsay 
testimony that Lynette Talbot owned the camper shell retrieved from his storage shed. 
Aplt. Br. at 42. Defendant provides no meaningful analysis grounded in the record and 
cites no authority demonstrating that this evidence was improperly before the jury. Aplt. 
Br. 42. His undeveloped claim should be rejected. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 364 n.4.13 
l3Defendant previously nominally commented that admission of this evidence 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 34. Defendant's 
undeveloped comment in that regard is also inadequate for appellate review. See Point 
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Even if defendant's claim is deemed adequate for review, he fails to establish any 
consequent prejudice in the admission of this hearsay testimony. Indeed, defendant 
complains only that he was not charged with theft of Talbot's camper shell. Aplt. Br. at 
42. He wholly fails to acknowledge, however, that evidence of uncharged misconduct is 
admissible to prove intent, a disputed element in this case. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b). See 
also Point 1(G), infra. Thus, the prosecutor elicited no information that the jury was not 
justified in considering. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342. Defendant's claim should be rejected 
on this ground. Id. 
D. Uncharged Misconduct 
In Point 11(B) of his brief, defendant alleges that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct in eliciting from Detective Bryson, defendant's statement that the washing 
machine was not junk and that he knew it was wrong to take it. Aplt. Br. at 44. 
Defendant challenged admission of this uncharged misconduct in conjunction with his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 36-38. For the same reasons 
that admission of this evidence did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, see 
Point 1(G)(2), infra, it does not amount to prosecutorial misconduct: The evidence is 
admissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, to refute defendant's claimed lack 
of intent {see R. 128: 145-47, 152), see add. A. 
1(F), infra. 
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Defendant also complains about the prosecutor's alleged reference to and/or 
admission of boxes of items and photographs of boxes of items allegedly removed from 
his truck and/or storage shed, but for which the State never produced an owner(s). Aplt. 
Br. at 44. Defendant fails to pinpoint his claims in the record; indeed, his allegations are 
devoid of record citation. Id. The State is unaware that any boxes of unclaimed property 
were admitted or otherwise relied upon by the prosecutor. As for the complained of 
photographs, appellant has not included the photographs in the record on appeal. The 
Court should therefore decline to reach these inadequately briefed, see Point 1(C)(1), 
infra, and unsupported claims, see Point 1(G)(1), infra. In any event, this additional 
evidence of uncharged misconduct, like the photographs discussed above, would be 
admissible under rule 404(b), to refute defendant's claimed lack of intent {see R. 128: 
145-47, 152), see add. A. See also Point 1(B)(2), (G)(2), infra}" 
14To the extent that defendant claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's 
alleged reliance on this evidence, he narrowly complains only that there was a dearth of 
evidence that he broke into the storage sheds. Aplt.t. Br. at 44. Defendant's self-serving 
assessment of the evidence against him is dubious, see Statement of the Facts, infra, 
particularly in light of the fact he has never denied entering the storage sheds and 
removing property which he hoped to sell at a swap meet (R. 128: 145-47, 152), see add. 
A. As noted previously, looting is not a defense to burglary. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
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THE COURT: This is the case of State of Utah vs. 
Michael Dittmer. The parties are present, the members of the 
Jury. Mr. Gravis. 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes. Call Michael Dittmer to the stand. 
THE COURT: Thank you. To the members of the Jury, 
last night we informed you that there would be no further 
testimony. We had some further meetings, and there will be 
brief testimony taken before I give you the Instructions and 
we close. 
MICHAEL DITTMER 
called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
£ State your name for the record. 
Mike Dittmer. 







And you understand you have a Constitutional right 
not to testify in this matter? 
A I do. 
Q And you are voluntarily giving up that right to 
testify today? 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay, Drawing your attention to the 29th of March 
of this year, did you have a storage shed at what's referred 
to as Mollerup? 
A Yes, sir. I just rented it that day. 
Q Okay. And you rented it that day, you say? 
A On the 29th of March. 
Q Okay. And were you at the Mollerup storage sheds 
that day? 
A I was. 
Q What time did you first arrive there? 
A I arrived there approximately 9:00 o'clock in the 
morning to rent the storage shed and put stuff in it. 
Q Okay. And which shed did you rent? 
A 655. 
Q 655 or--and then what happened then? 
A Well, I had--I lost my apartment. I had all my 
stuff in my truck. And there was some stuff I wanted to try 
to take to the swap meet to sell. And some stuff I wanted to 
keep. That was all mixed up. So I ended up like having to 
unload the whole truck, put the stuff I wanted to keep in the 
storage shed, put the stuff I wanted to take to the swap meet 
back into the truck. 
Q Okay. Then what happened? 
A As I was putting my stuff in the storage shed, I 
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looked two doors down. The door was wide open, and there was 
a washing machine sitting there. And I looked and the lid wa^ 
kind of tied open, because the hoses were up and in. And I 
noticed that the center of the washing machine had been broker} 
off. And I thought, wow, thatfs not that bad of a deal. It 
could be fixed. Shoot, my mom's was broke like that and they 
rigged it to where it worked. It is better than she has got. 
I will take this and give it to her, thinking that it was leftj 
there because it had been broken and they had either decided 
it was too heavy to load, or didn't want it any longer. And T\ 
looked around some more, and there was some more stuff and 
more--
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, I am going to object to this) 
line of testimony. He is not answering questions. He is just] 
rambling. And I am objecting that he is not being asked 
questions, and it is non-responsive at this point. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The objection is sustained. 
Q Okay. After you looked at the washing machine, what] 
did you do with it? 
A I pulled I down, scooted it down and stuck it into 
my shed. 
Q And then what happened? 
A I--that's when I looked around. I saw there was 
still more stuff that was like kind of out in the aisles. 
Q Okay. Where did you see more? 
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A All over. There were several of them open. Some 
just had simply empty boxes. Some had papers. One had 
motorcycle parts, some printers and stuff. 
Q Did you see the one that had the couch in it? 
A Not--well, no, not at that time. After I seen them, 
yeah. I walked into the other building and I saw there was 
still more. And I saw the one with the couch in it. 
Q Okay. Was this the same building or a different 
building? 
A It is actually the same building. However, it has 
been divided into two sections, two aisleways. 
Q Okay. What did you do after you saw the one with 
the couch in it? 
A Well, I kind of looked around in there. Like I 
said, I had my own stuff I was taking to the swap meet. I 
though, shoot, you know there wasn't anything really worth 
anything in there. Just what I thought, I am going to the 
swap meet anyway, if I can get a quarter out of it, I will 
take it. And if I don't, you know, I will do whatever there, 
dispose of it at that time. 
And like I said, I looked around. And I saw there was a 
little teddy bear, stuffed animals, papers were all over, 
boxes and everything. And I saw the couch. I thought, well, 
that actually--I was by myself. I wasn't going to lift it. 









shed at that time? 
A I did take anything I thought I could sell for a 
quarter or better. Several Books of Mormon, the day planner, 
stuffed animals. 
Q Where did you put those? 
A I put them in my truck 
Q Okay. Did you take any other items? After you put 
8
 I] them in your truck, what did you do? 
A Well, after I had gone through and seen everything, 
all the different storage sheds they had, whatever I thought l\ 
could get a quarter for I got. I loaded it into my truck and 
I left. And I went down to Robert Amador's 
13
 || Q And what did you do when you got to Robert Amador's?) 
4 M
 A Well, Robert Amador, he is not a very well to do 
15
















MR. DAINES: I will object to this, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q When you got to Robert Amador's what did you do? 
Just answer the question I asked. 
Q Well, actually I gave him some, and the kids some of| 
the teddy bears. Whatever I thought, you know, they would 
appreciate. Robert has got a couch there that they sleep on. 
And it was really banged up, ugly, tore up missing cushions 
too. His bed was simply a mattress on the floor. Stuff that 
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way. 
Q Okay. Did you talk to him--did you have a 
conversation with Robert Amador? 
A I did. 
Q And what did you tell him? 
A I told him, I says, hey, dude, I was just up there 
at the swap meet, or at my storage shed. There was a couch 
there that is pretty nice, looked pretty nice. Tomorrow I am 
sure they are just going to throw it in the dumpster. If you 
want it, we should go get it. 
Q And then what did you do? 
A Well, he didn't really want anything to do with it. 
He said nah, don't worry about it. I said it is a lot better 
than what you got. I actually kind of persuaded him to go up 
there and look at this couch because, you know, I knew it was 
going to go in the dumpster and--
Q Did you go up and look at the couch? 
A We did. Well, we was going to go up to the store 
anyway to get the kids some Easter baskets. At that time I 
said the storage shed is right there, do you want to look at 
the couch. If you don't want it, we won't get it. 
Q Okay. So you went up there and you--
A And I showed him and the couch and he said well, it 
is. And we looked at it. We put the cushions all on it. It 
was missing a cushion. I said--you know, I said it is still 
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better than what you got. The one cushion you sit on is all 
one. And like I said, the kids sleep on the couch. So I 
thought that would be a lot better--
MR. DAINES: I will object to what he thought, your 
Honor, about the children. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Stricken, disregard it. 
MR. DAINES: No evidence Mr. Amador had children. 
Q So you loaded up the couch, is that right? 
A We did. He decided he wanted it. 
Q Other than the teddy bears you say you gave to the 
children, what did you do with the other stuff you loaded up 
prior from the storage shed that had the items--
A It was in my truck. 
Q So how many teddy bears did you give to his 
children? 
A Well, he has three kids. They each got one, I 
guess. 
Q Okay. 
A I don't know if they even all got one or not. 
Q Okay. And then when the police--when officer 
Hackworth, the first police officer, arrived, where were you 
at? 
A I was--well, we put the couch on top of the thing, 
and we needed something to strap it down with. And I told 
him, well, look around and see if you can find any cords or a 
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rope or anything we can tie the thing down to. And I was up 
trying to get--starting to get to where I could tie it down. 
And the police officer pulled out. I just walked out and was 
kind of checking it out. And he had pulled up. And I 
thought--
MR. DAINES: I will object to what he thought, your 
Honor. 
Q Just testify to what you did, not what you thought. 
A And then I just--I like--well, he pulled up and 
stopped, and I just waited for him to get out to do his job, 3] 
guess. 
Q Okay. 
A Explained what we were doing. 
MR. DAINES: Objection, your Honor, not in response 
to a question. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Disregard that. 
Q Now--
THE COURT: Mr. Dittmer, it is important that you 
just answer the question. 
A That was the answer to the last question. I sit 
there and waited--
THE COURT: Wait just a minute. 
Q Now, when the officer arrived, did he ask you 
whether you were there alone or with someone? 
A I am not for sure what he said right at first. 
1481 
Yeah, he did ask at one point whether there was somebody else 
He asked me what I was doing. 
Q Okay. When did he ask you what you were doing? 
A Right at first he asked me what I was doing. 
Q What did you tell him? 
A I said well, we were loading up this couch and 
stuff. Going through and getting what we could out of these 
sheds. I told him it was going to be thrown away in my 
opinion. 
Q Okay. Now when you first saw these sheds, what was 
the condition of the doors? 
A It was just rolled up. The doors, they roll up just] 
like a garage door. And they were--they were all rolled up. 
Not partially, all the way up. 
Q Okay. And then did you and the officer go find 
Robert? 
A I believe we did. 
Q Okay. 
A It seems to me--now it seems to me we were still 
standing there and he was questioning me. And--well, he was. 
He was asking me my name and stuff. And then Robert had come 
out of the whole building, not just the storage shed, the 
whole building, with some books and like a strap or some cords) 
that we were going to use to tie down the couch. And just 
kind of walked up and there he was. And he just kind of 
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stopped. 
Q Okay. Now when you say he was asking your name, 
what name did you give him? 
A I did--
Q What name did you give him? 
A Whatever he said it was. I donft know. I just 
thought up something. Michael whatever it was. I don't know 
Q Why did you give him a false name? 
A Because I was afraid there was a warrant out for me 
for a DUI ticket that I had previously gotten. 
Q Okay. 
A An unpaid ticket. 
Q Okay. Now when Robert came--when you and the 
officer and Robert started to talking, did the officer ask yoi^  
what you were doing there? 
A I am sure he did. 
Q Okay. Now at any time did they ask you whose 
property was in the back of your truck? 
A He did ask me, yeah, where the stuff was coming 
from. 
Q Did he ask you first off--did either Officer 
Hackworth or Officer Stephens ask you whose property that was?) 
A I imagine. I mean I told him we were just getting 
stuff out of the different sheds. 
Q Did you ever tell him it was all your property? 
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A After--after the lady had gotten there, or at the 
time that they had--yeah, they did ask me if it was all my 
property. And I said--I said well, I would have to look in 
there. There may be some little bits of stuff. I said but I 
would have to look in there and go through it to be positively 
sure. But, yes, I said most of that stuff was mine. 
Q Okay. 
A Actually, they were asking me what--
MR. DAINES: Objection, your Honor. He is now not 
responding to questions. 
MR. GRAVIS: Just answer the questions. 
A All right. 
Q Did they ask if they could look in the back of your 
truck? 
A At one point they did, yes. 
Q And what was your response? 
A Sure. 
Q Who opened the door? 
A I did. 
Q Okay. Later on you gave a statement to Detective 
Bryson here, is that correct? 
A Excuse me* 
Q You gave a statement to the Detective here? 
A Yes. 
Q And at that time did you indicate what you thought 
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the property--who the property belonged to? 
A I did, 
Q And who did you tell her? 
A I told her because I had previously rented a shed 
from that place, and almost had my--
MR. DAINES: Objection, your Honor, it is not 
responding to the question. 
THE COURT: Just respond to the question. 
A I told her that, yes, that there was storage sheds 
there that I thought had been repoed that were left open and 
the owners had apparently taken what they wanted out of it. 
The auction guy had apparently taken what he was going to sell] 
out of it. The rest was left there for what I assumed was 
going to be picked up and thrown in the dumpster. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay. I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: Mr. Daines. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DAINES: 
Q Let's get two things out of the way right off the 
bat. The hype kit found on the front of your seat during the 
impound inventory of your truck is yours? 
A Yes sir. 
Q That is used for the ingestion of controlled 
substances such as cocaine and methamphetamine, right? 
A It has been. 
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Judging from your appearance, it is methamphetamineJ 
Judging by my appearance--
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I object, it is irrelevant. 
Did you use methamphetamine? 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I object, it is irrelevant. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained in the form ofl 
the question. 
Q The hype kit is for the ingestion of 
methamphetamine? 
A The hype kit was--was something that I had had in my 
stuff. I saw it. I was going to throw it away. I wanted to 
keep the pouch. And I wanted to find a proper place to 
dispose of whatever else. 
It is for the ingestion of methamphetamine? 
It could be. 
Isn't that what you have been using it for? 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, objection. 
MR. DAINES: He has taken the witness stand. He is 
subject to cross-examination. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, it is irrelevant. He said 
it could be. It is irrelevant whether he used methamphetamine 
in the past or not. The issue is not what it was used for. 
It was whether it could be. That's the issue here today. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer the question. 


















MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am going to object. This 
is improper. It is irrelevant. And may we approach the 
Bench? 
THE COURT: I have overruled the objection. Answer 
the question. 
MR. GRAVIS: I object under Rule 4 04. It is 
improper. The prejudice is--the State is trying to prejudice 
the Jury by this. The prejudicial effect clearly outweighs 
any probative value. He testified it could be used for the 
ingestion of methamphetamine. That's all he needs to prove tc| 
prove a paraphernalia case. 
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, if he has agreed we have 
proved the paraphernalia case, I will withdraw the question. 
THE COURT: Proceed. 
MR. DAINES: If he has agreed to that. 
Q Also at the time that you were arrested a bag of 
marijuana was found in your pocket, is that correct? 
A There was some marijuana parts in a cellophane. 
Q Okay, thank you. Now let's go to the 2 9th of March, 
1997. On that morning you testified that you went to the 
Mollerup storage at about 9:00 o'clock for the purpose of 
renting a storage shed. 
Q Did you say the 27th? 
Q The 29th, I am sorry. 
A Yes, the 29th I did. 
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Q You rented a storage shed? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You drove your green truck there? 
A I did. 
Q And you put nothing of your own in the storage shed 
at the time that you rented it, correct? 
A No, sir, that!s wrong. I did have lots of stuff in 
there. 
Q You rented that storage shed for the purpose of 
going back later with Robert Amador and taking things out of 
other people's sheds, correct? 
A No, sir, I--
Q Let's go over this. You went to the place at 9:00 
o'clock, right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Then after you went to that place between 9:30--
about 10:00 a.m. after renting that storage shed you went to 
Robert Amador's house, correct? 
A After I had left there, yes. 
Q The first place you went after you rented this 
storage shed on this day was Robert Amador's? 
A Actually I don't believe so. I think I went to my 
home and loaded more of my stuff in my truck. 
Q But then you went--by 10:00 a.m. you were at Robert 
Amador's house, right? 
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A I went to Robert's. 
Q You went into his house, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q You told him that you had just rented a storage 
shed, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q At that time you stayed at Robert Amador's home 
until noon? 
A Longer than that. 
Q You stayed there approximately two hours? 
A Longer than that. 
Q And at this period of time you had said absolutely 
nothing to Robert Amador about the couch between 10:00 and 
12:00 a.m., correct? 
A I am not for sure what time I told him about the 
couch. 
Q Is it possible that between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 
a.m. you said absolutely nothing to Robert Amador about the 
couch? 
A It is possible, but probably improbable. 
Q Thank you. Then you left Robert Amador's house and 
returned about 3:00 p.m. to Robert Amador's house, correct? 
A It could possibly be, yes. 
Q Okay. So when you say I went there and then went tc| 
Robert Amador's house, you actually went to Robert Amador's 
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house two times; once in the morning and once at 3:00 p.m., 
correct? 
A It could be. I left and went--that!s when I took m^ j 
stuff and left. 
Q All right. And at that time you told him you saw a 
couch? 
A Okay. 
Q And at that time you took him over there to--but yo\^  
did not leave at 3:00 p.m. You didn't go over until about 
6:00, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Just before it got dark you guys went to the 
Mollerup place? 
A Actually he didn't want to go there. He wanted to 
go to the store to cash a check to get the kids an Easter 
basket. 
Q But you did--I know you like to talk about his kids, 
but I didn't ask you about his kids. You went to Mollerup 
Storage with Robert Amador? 
A At the time we left his home, we had--
Q Did you go to Mollerup Storage with Robert Amador at] 
6:00 o'clock? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. And so you have actually been to Mollerup, 
then to Amador's house, then gone for three hours, then back 
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to Amador's house at 3:00 p.m., and it is not until 6:00 p.m. 
that you then go to Mollerup, right? 
A Sir, we were leaving to go to the store. We weren't) 
leaving to go to Mollerup. 
Q But you did go to Mollerup? 
A We ended up there, yes. 
Q Okay. Then when you got to Mollerup1s, when the 
police officer arrived, the storage shed from which you took 
much of Nicole Ayer's property is not in the same door as your) 
storage shed, is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q In fact, if we show you State's proposed Exhibit 
number 1, this shows the couch out by your truck, right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q It shows an open door, right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Right in the upper right hand corner as you face the) 
photograph there is a door? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And the hallway inside that door goes to Nicole 
Ayer's storage shed? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q In fact, you can also see way down here, the door 
that goes into your storage shed? 
A Yes, sir. 
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Q And your truck is not parked in front of your door, 
it is parked in front of Nicole Ayerfs door, correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. DAINES: All right. May I again approach the 
Jury so they can see what I was referring to immediately? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. DAINES: May I point it out to them? Martin, do 
you have an objection to that, since the witness chair is oveij 
here? 
MR. GRAVIS: If you want to point things out, that's 
fine. 
MR. DAINES: Nicole Ayer's door in the corner, the 
door into the hallway where the Defendant's storage shed is 
located. 
Q You then went into--you parked your truck outside 
Nicole Ayer's storage shed and you went in to where her 
storage shed, 552, was. You and Amador, right? 
A The door leads to a hallway that goes to many 
storage sheds. 
Q And you got that door about halfway up--
A No, sir, that door was already open totally. 
Q And the couch was only pulled halfway out? 
A I am not sure if it was pulled out at all. 
Q And all of the sudden, Solomon Le Doux walked in. 
You didn't know him, did you? 
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A I didn't even see him. 
Q But a man walked in, and at the time he walked in, 
the storage shed was still only--the door was only halfway up,| 
and the couch was only halfway pulled out of the shed, 
correct? 
A No, that's not correct. 
Q In other words, Solomon Le Doux caught you guys 
right in the act of getting into that shed, didn't he? 
A I have no idea what he saw or didn't see. I didn't 
even see him. 
Q And by the time the police officer arrived, not ver^ 
long after Mr. Le Doux was in there, you already then had the 
couch up on top of your truck, right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q When the officers asked you who does the property 
belong to in the back, you told him it is all mine? 
A I told him it was my stuff in the back of my truck. 
Q All your stuff in the back of the truck? 
A When he said is it all yours, I said I would have to) 
observe it. There may be some little stuff there that I have 
got. 
Q Little stuff. Calling your attention to what has 
been marked P-7, all of that property belonging to Nicole 
Ayers was in the back of your truck, right? 



























Q The toaster is yours. All of the rest of the 
property is Nicole Ayers? 
A Well, I would have to see what all was in them 
boxes. 
Q And yet--
A Because I do know there was some--
Q Her bed, right? 
A Her bed. 
Q There is a bed frame right there? 
A Oh, the bed frame was hers, yes. 
Q The couch is hers? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q She has testified that this box is hers that has her| 
name on it? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And yet when the officer first asked you whose 
property is in the back, you said it is all mine? 
A It is my stuff, yes. 
Q And you were lying to the officer, it was Nicole 
Ayer's stuff? 
MR. DAINES: You don't have to answer that. I have 
no further questions, your Honor. 
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may stand down. Mr. Gravis. 



























The Defense rests. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Daines, anything further' 
MR. DAINES: No, your Honor. 




Q But he didn't volunteer any information? 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am going to object. This 
is improper questioning. 
THE COURT: On what basis? 
MR. GRAVIS: You can't use his silence as evidence. 
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, I have never heard of that. 
There is a United States Supreme Court decision called Doyle 
vs. Ohio that says you can't use silence after Miranda 
warning. But they are not nearly to that point. 
MR. GRAVIS: There is also case law that says you 
can't use a Defendant's silence pre-Miranda 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You may 
proceed. 
MR. DAINES: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q Did you then--where did you go after he showed you 
where his storage shed was? 
A Well, as he stopped and showed me where it was, 
another individual come walking out of the storage unit that 
was--
Q How far from you was this other individual? 
A About four or five units down. 
Q And we are talking about in a hallway with 
approximately what number of these little storage units? 
A Oh, Geez, 75 or a hundred on each side. 
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Q This is a big building? 
A Yeah, a big building. 
Q So you were about five storage units away, and 
somebody comes out? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q How--and put me about where five storage units from 
you would be. Can I make it with this wall, or--
A It is probably--I would estimate probably about thi^ 
distance. 
Q All right. And you have indicated that it was diml}| 
lit? 
A Yes. 
Q At the time that this person came out, did he look 
at you? 
A Yeah, he came out and kind of--I don't know, he 
appeared not startled, but a little surprised. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am going to object as 
calling for conclusions on the part of the witness. 
Q Just describe what he did. 
THE COURT: That is--that objection is sustained. 
That is stricken. The answer that he gave of being startled, 
the conclusion, that is stricken. That's not within his 
prerogative to make that conclusion. 
Ask your next question, Mr. Daines. 
Q Just describe what you saw him do. 
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A I saw him come out of the storage unit. And he was 
carrying some books. 
Q What did he then do? 
A He then just kind of--he just stopped. 
Q Okay. Did he do anything after he stopped? 
A Not at that point. 
Q What did you do at this point? 
A At this point I asked him--I asked him what he was 
doing, what they were doing. 
Q Well, did that guy remain there? 
A He--when he came out and saw me, he kind of went 
like this and then started to go back into the storage unit. 
I said, no, wait. I said come here, I says, you know, I need 
to talk to you. 
Q Now, you have indicated it was dimly lighted in 
there. Was there enough light that at this distance he shoulc| 
have seen your uniform? 
MR. GRAVIS: Objection, your Honor. It calls for 
speculation. 
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, all speculation isnft 
objectionable. Speculation based on information that is 
available to a layman through his own sense and through his 
own experience is not objectionable. 
THE COURT: Okay. The objection is sustained. You 
may ask the question in his opinion, because a layman can give! 
29 
an opinion of that distance. But not whether or not that 
individual--
Q In your opinion could he have--should he have seen 
your police uniform? 
A In my opinion, yes. I had my flashlight with me. 
And it was on. And we were at a distance where, you know, I 
easily recognized him. 
All right. Now he started back into the shed? 
Correct. 
What did you say at that point? 
I says come here, I need to talk to you. 
And did he come back at that point? 
Yes, he did. 
So you are now in there with two of these people? 
That's correct. 
Is that correct? 
Yes, it is. 
All right. What then did you ask these two people? 
At this point we--we--I had them come back out. I 
had them follow me out of the storage units so--I felt a 
little uncomfortable being in there in that situation with 
two--the two people. And I asked them to come--step back 
out. I knew there was another offi cer that was—that's 
usually general protocol, another officer responds in a 


























or anything, we went back out and waited for the other office^ 
to arrive. 
Q So you are now back outdoors? 
A Correct. 
Q Is it still light now, if you remember, Officer. 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Okay. What did you ask them once you got them 
outside? 
A Let me refer to my report here. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, before he responds, I want 
to object to what he asked them. Mr. Daines can ask what he 
asked Mr. Dittmer and what Mr. Dittmer responded. 
MR. DAINES: I don't think that's correct, your 
Honor. I think--
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. He can--Mr 
Daines can ask him what statements he made. You may have 
raised your objection--
Q What question did you ask them at that time? 
A I asked them at that time if they had been going 
through storage units someone else was renting. 
Q And this question was directed at both of them? 
A That is correct, yes. 
Q Did one of the two answer at this time? 
A Yes. 
Q Which one answered? 
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A The Defendant did. 
Q What did he say to you? 
A He said they were going through unlocked storage 
units trying to find stuff they could take to the swap meet. 
Q To the swap meet. And so he indicated to you at 
that time that they had been entering units? 
A Correct. 
Q What--after he told you that, what did you ask him? 
A I asked him what they had found. 
Q Now who was this question directed to? 
A At that time I was speaking with the Defendant. 
Q Were you looking at him at that time? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Who responded to the question what did you 
find? 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am renewing my objection. 
This is not proper testimony. The Defendant's silence is not 
admissible. 
THE COURT: Overruled at this point. Answer the 
question. 
A Robert, the other individual stated that they--
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I will object to what Robert) 
had to say too. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DAINES: May I respond to that? 
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THE COURT: We are going to get through one 
objection, then we are going to move to the next objection. 
MR. DAINES: All right. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled, and he may 
answer what he--what question he asked. 
MR. GRAVIS: He has already done that. 
THE COURT: No, you objected before that. So now let] 
me get--ask that question. 
Q Who--
THE COURT: Ask whatever question you want. 
Q Okay. What my next question was, who then responded} 
to the question posed to this Defendant? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may answer that. 
A Okay. Robert. 
Q What did he say, would be my next question. 
MR. GRAVIS: Objection, your Honor, hearsay. 
MR. DAINES: I would submit it is not hearsay because! 
it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It is) 
offered simply to show that that statement was made in the 
presence of the Defendant. So that the Defendant would have 
heard it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis? 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, it is hearsay on the part of| 
a co-defendant who is not called as a witness, is not 
subjected to cross-examination. Furthermore, it is not — his 
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silence again as I have stated is not admissible. 
MR. DAINES: First of all, it is. But secondly, I anj 
not asking for his silence. I am asking for what this other 
person said. This is not a confession. And this is not--
which is what he is referring to when he says it is not 
admissible against him. And it is admissible. And it is 
relevant because it shows what this Defendant heard in the 
presence of the officer, which would then lead to some other 
things the Defendant said. 
It is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. DAINES: Thank you. 
THE COURT: This is--this is an area of the law where) 
we have what we call hearsay. And we do not allow hearsay 
evidence in because they are statements of people outside the 
court because they cannot be cross-examined and for some other] 
reasons. However, there are exceptions. The Court is going 
to allow the answer to this question. But I am going to tell 
you that it is not being admitted for the truth. It is just 
for purposes of showing what--how the investigation proceeded. 
The objection is overruled. You may answer the question. 
But to the Jury, it is not--the question--the answer is 
not going to whether or not--it does not matter whether or not] 
the answer is true or not true. It is a matter of how the 
investigation was proceeding. 
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MR. DAINES: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q What did Robert Amador say? 
A He stated they had found a couch, a washer and a 
truck shell. 
Q Did he tell you where the couch was? 
A On top of the truck. 
Q Did--had you in fact seen the couch on top of the 
truck? 
A Yes, I had. 
Q Now, did the Defendant tell you how the couch got orj 
to the truck? 
A No, he didn't. 
Q He did not, all right. After Robert Amador told yoi^  
about the shell, the washer and the couch, did the Defendant 
say anything? 
A Yes, he did. He said that the washer and the shell 
were in his storage unit. 
Q In his storage unit? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Had--did anyone else arrive at this time as 
you were outside? 
A While I was outside speaking with them Sergeant 
Stephens then arrived for backup. 
Q Did you then have a conversation with the Defendant 
about something unrelated to specifically the property that 
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you had found him with? 
A Yeah, I talked with him about several things. I 
asked him how long he had been there, you know. He stated 
that he had been there three or four times that day. 
Q Did he tell you how many truck loads he had taken 
out of there? 
A I recall he said that he had been there moving stuf^ 
three or four different times that day, not how many truck 
loads. 
Q You didn't get that specific with him? 
A Correct. 
Q Did you then get into a conversation with him about 
his name? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What caused you to get into the conversation about 
his name? 
A Upon getting his name, and once we got back outside, 
we have a standard procedure where we check a person for 
driver's licenses and any wants or warrants. In running his 
name, nothing came back on the computer. There was no record 
found. 
Q Does that mean no record of a driver's license? 
A There was nothing. There was no record whatsoever. 
Q Under Mike Bradshaw with that birth date? 
A Correct. 
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Q Okay. So what did you do when you found that out? 
A I kind of questioned him very calmly. I asked him 
if he had a Utah Driver's license. He stated that he had, 
which would have shown up on the computer. I spoke with him ^ 
little more and told him, you know, I didn't feel that I was 
getting the correct information. And after speaking with him 
for a few minutes he said, well, that — 
Q Did he tell you--now let me ask questions at this 
point to make sure we don't get into something that won't be 
admissible. Did he tell you at this point what his name was? 
A Yes, he did get--
Q What did he tell you his name was at that time? 
A He told me his name was Mike Dittmer. 
Q Did he correct the birth date he had earlier given 
you also? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Do you know the new birth date that he gave you? 
A I believe it was 4/10 of "60, or 4/10 of "61. 
Q Something like that? 
A Correct. 
Q But he did correct it? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q All right. Now is Officer Stephens standing with 
you at this time? 
A He is there, yes. 
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Q Did you ask the Defendant where the stuff in the 
back of his truck came from? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did he tell you where that stuff came from? 
A Yes, he said that they had gone--again, they had 
gone through the storage units--in the truck or on it? 
Q In the truck 
A Oh, in the truck? 
Q Inside the truck. 
A He said that--he was talking with Officer or 
Sergeant Stephens at that point. And I heard him say it had 
been in there for days. 
Q This is not a conversation you had directly with 
him? 
A No. At this point Sergeant Stephens was kind of 
talking with him as I was waiting for the information to come 
back off the radio. 
Q All right. So you heard him say it was his, it had 
been in there for days. But you didn't hear the entirety of 
that conversation? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Now, did anyone else arrive in this area at this 
point? 
A Yes. During this point a lady in a truck pulled up 
on the opposite side of the truck we were standing on. And 
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Sergeant Stephens went over to talk to her and find out if shq 
was any way--you know, if she was involved in anything. What 
she was doing there. 
Q Did he then come back and ask the Defendant anything 
in your presence? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q What did he ask him? 
A He asked him--he asked him if he had a blue aluminunj 
camper shell. 
Q Now the Defendant had previously told you he had a 
camper shell on his unit? 
A Correct. 
Q Where did the Defendant say at this point? 
A Let me just refer to my--at that point it was--we 
kind of said, you know, it sounds kind of like the one you 
found. And at that point Mike asked if we wanted to see the 
washer and the shell that was in his unit. 
Q Okay, but this was after you had brought it up? 
A Correct. 
Q Now did you call anyone else at this time; anybody 
else from your police department? 
A I believe--I donft know if it was at this time that 
Detective--yeah, Detective Bryson was then notified as to what] 
was going on. 




Q Where was this unit located? 
A It was--the unit that--his unit was located in the 
first hallway we had went down, number 665. 
Q All right. And did he open it? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Were you there when he opened it? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q What was in that unit? 
A All I can recall being in there was the washer and 
the shell was kind of--kind of an odd fit. The shell was kind} 
of tipped up over, kind of over the washer. 
Q And did--was Lynnette Talbot with you? 
A Yes. 
Q What did she say in your presence when the door was 
opened and the shell appeared? 
A That was the shell that she was there to pick up. 
Q Okay. After you located this property in the 
Defendant's unit, did you ask him if there was anything in 
his--the back of his truck that he had picked up there, or 
words to that effect? 
A Yeah. He said everything in the truck was his. 
Q All right. Did he ask you--did he indicate to you 
you could look in it? 
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Officer Hackworth where they had found the couch. 
A I don't recall they said where they had at that 
point, but I remember that Mr. Dittmer said that they had 
found it. 
Q When you got there, did you see--were there any 
vehicles that were not marked patrol cars from Roy P.D. there 
A There was. 
Q What was there? 
A It was an older green Ford pickup truck with a 
camper shell on it. 
Q Calling your attention to State's P-6, was this it? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Did you notice anything in the back of this 
truck? 
A I did. 
Q What did you notice? 
A It was completely full of all types of miscellaneous) 
merchandise, furniture pieces, pictures, boxes, electronic 
items, all kinds of things. 
Q All right. Did--were they asked in your presence 
who the property in the back of the green pickup belonged to? 
A Yes. 
Q Did anyone answer that question? 
A Yes. 
Q Who answered that question? 
791 
A Mr. Dittmer. 
Q And what did he say? 
A He said that the things that were in the back of th^ 
truck were his. That all the things in the back of his truck 
were his, 
Q And you specifically recall his saying all? 
A I do. 
Q Okay. Did the Defendant say how long those things 
had been in the back of his pickup? 
A He said for a long time. 
Q In the presence of the Defendant and you, did Amadoij 
tell you anything about the property in the back of the truck? 
MR. GRAVIS: Objection, our Honor. Mr. Amador is not) 
here to testify. It is hearsay. And it is clearly 
objectionable, it is clearly inadmissible. 
THE COURT: Mr. Daines? 
MR. DAINES: I am not going to argue too strenuously 
that it isn't. But it might not be offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted. And I could make a proffer out of it. 
THE COURT: I think in this case it is sustained. 
MR. DAINES: That's fine, I am not going to argue toc| 
strenuously I should get that in. 
Q In the presence--but you did have a conversation 





























A I am sorry. 
Q You don't know if it worked or didn't work? 
A I don't. 
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further. 
MR. DAINES: I have nothing further of this witness, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may stand down. May this witness be 
excused? 
MR. DAINES: Yes. 
MR. GRAVIS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, before the State calls 
another witness, I have a Motion to make. 
THE COURT: Thank you. We are going to excuse the 
members of the Jury. We have one matter I am going to hear a 
Motion outside of your presence. If you will please go with 
the Bailiff. 
(Jury retired from the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis. 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor. 
At this time I move for a mistrial on the basis of the 
Court's allowing the State to present the Defendant's pre-
arrest, pre-Miranda silence in the case in chief. As I stated 
before, there was a case in Utah that's on point. I do have a 
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copy of the case. It is State of Utah vs. Palmer, that 
specifically says it is not admissible in their case in chief 
If the Defendant takes the stand and the testimony is 
inconsistent with his pre-Miranda, pre-arrest silence, then itj 
is admissible for impeachment purposes. He hasn't taken the 
stand. The State put it on in its case in chief. Therefore 
it is improper. 
Furthermore, your Honor, on top of that, the State 
bolstered the credibility of this last witness without his 
testimony being impeached. Therefore in State vs. Perez, 
which Mr. Daines is well aware of, prohibits the State from 
doing that. Until I impeach a witness, or attempt to impeach 
a witness, he can't bolster his testimony. You allowed him td 
do that by saying is this stuff in your police report, because) 
I had impeached the prior witness with statements in the 
police report. I had not even questioned this witness, let 
alone tried to impeach him. Therefore it is improper for the 
State to do that. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The State? 
MR. DAINES: In response to the first one, your 
Honor, I asked the one question, when you went by the shed did 
he say anything to you. Silence is after questioning. He did] 
not testify to any questioning. I simply asked the question, 
did he say anything to you when he walked by the shed. No, he| 
didnft. What the silence pre-Miranda and post-Miranda cases, 
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and particularly Doyle vs. Ohio are talking about are 
questioning and then silence. And there were no questions 
asked. I simply asked the question did he say anything as yoij 
went around there. Silence presumes a question. 
On the second one, your Honor, they are way overreading 
the Perez decision on that. When you ask an officer if he 
created a police report with what he just said, that's not 
bolstering the credibility of the witness, that's just asking 
him to state a specific fact. 
But furthermore, your Honor will note that I kept asking 
the officer did they say anything to you. Did you say 
anything to them. I was using the plural pronoun. Mr. Gravi^ 
kept objecting. Then I would say to him who said that. And 
he would say Mr. Dittmer. And then I asked him specifically 
about his police report. Did you write he or them in your 
police report. He said I wrote the plural. I should have 
written singular, or words to that effect. So that's why that| 
was relevant. And that's not bolstering the credibility of a 
police officer I would submit by simply asking him if he 
created a police report, and if he put that in it. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I--
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. GRAVIS: I would submit that the State is asking 
basically for testimony, if it is consistent with the report, 
prior to asking him about the they and them part. I do agree 
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Mr. Daines did that. But Mr. Daines in his opening statement,] 
and in his prior testimony that I objected to, has brought up 
about when--that they asked Mr. Dittmer a question about what 
they had found. And that Mr. Amador answered. And I objecte4 
to Mr. Amador's testimony as improper. And I believe Mr. 
Daines argued well--right when I made the first objection it 
is admissible to show that Mr. Dittmer heard the answer and 
didn't respond. 
MR. DAINES: No, I didn't say--I didn't say anything 
about whether he responded. 
MR. GRAVIS: I let you speak, it is my turn totspeak 
But, your Honor, he did indicate that it was admissible 
to show basically--their argument was to show the Defendant's 
state of mind, that he didn't answer the question, that 
somebody else did. So it is a question he was silent on it. 
I objected to it on this basis, and in the opening statement, 
and I objected to it during the testimony about it. And it is( 
clearly similar to the Palmer situation. 
THE COURT: I want you to identify for me, Mr. 
Gravis, Mr. Daines is talking about one area of the silence, 
and you appear to be referring to another area of the silence. 
MR. GRAVIS: I am referring to two areas of silence. 
The State has put on whether he was asked any questions when 
he walked past the storage shed about what was in the storage 
shed is clearly irrelevant. If he wasn't asked any questions, 
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his silence as to why he didn't say anything should not be 
admissible. Mr. Daines has brought that in to show that--a 
guilty mind. 
Bi 11 moi e :i mpoi tai 111 y t: 1 ie other part i s - -1hey brought up 
here in the opening--I asked them :i f they wer e going through 
the storage units that someone else rented. Mike said they 
were g o i n g t h r o u g 1: i u n i t s 11 I a t w e i e i i o t ] o c k e ci 11 y i n g !:  o £ :i i l ci 
stuff to take to the swap meet. I asked them what they had 
found. And then Robert answered they had found a couch, a 
truck shelj. I '1 le c ouc '1 l was : i i tc j: • c: f I Ii ke " s t] i i : 
THE COURT: But that isn't--that was admitted--that 
was admitted as to hearsay rule. And you are claiming because) 
Mike answered it, the Defendant--
MR. GRAVIS: Robert answered. 
THE COURT: I mean Robert answered. And Mr. Dittmer 
did not answer it, that somehow that's the silence and--I 
don't get the connection. 
MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Daines went to great points to make 
sure the Jury knows the question was asked to Mike and Robert 
answered he is trying to use the Defendant's silence 
in his case chief to show the guilty mind. 
MR. DAINES: May I respond to that? 
THE COURT: No. The Court is denying the motion on 
t h e f i r s t : motd oi :i i i id I 1 la « e i: lot t a k e n a 1; c ok a t til l a t c a s e , 
Mr. Gravis. You say it is directly on point, 1 will look at 
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the facts of it and allow you at some further time to renew 
your motion. But at this point it is denied. 
As to the second point--as to the second point that was 
raised, the bolstering, that's your conclusion. That's not 
the Court's conclusion. The motion is denied. 
Your next witness, Mr. Daines, is ready? 
MR. DAINES: We are ready, yes. 
THE COURT: Bring the Jury back in. 
(Jury returned to the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Would you make--do you want me--I will 
get copies of it if you will let me have that. Thank you. 
The Jury is present. Mr. Daines, you may proceed. 
MR. DAINES: Thank you, your Honor. At this time we 
will call Officer Tim Jensen to the stand. 
TIM JENSEN 
called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DAINES: 
Q State your name and occupation, please. 
A Tim Jensen, police officer, Roy City. 
Q And were you employed by Roy City on the 2nd of 
April, 1997? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q What is your primary duty with Roy City? 
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Addendum C 
Q So what you have is a standard looking out storage 
shed, a i 1 :i t: II: i € i i :: • i 1 1 1 lii i n s :i d e , si i: ia "1 1 e r :: • i ie s t: 1 Ia t: a i: e :i i I a 
building? 
A Yes. 
Q • What kii id of doors do tl le inside storage sheds have?) 
A They got like sliding doors. They just lift up. 
Q And can you lock them? 
A Yes. 
Q Where does the lock go on the storage shed doors? 
A They got like a little latch where it latches up anc| 
it goes into the wall. 
Q Okay. So on the 29th, you had two storage sheds 
there and you rented from Mollerup? 
A Yes. 
Q When you were at Mollerup did you see anything 
unusu . le premises? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you see? 
A I see i i t: ,/ :::> i i: i e i i 1 1 i a t: w e r e - - o n e o f t: 1 i a i i i « a s ] :i ) :  • = 
suspicious. He was anxious and he kept looking out, He was 
there inside the small ones. And they were going through the 
of them. 
Q All right. What were they doing after they would gc| 
through the storage units? 
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A One of them was like a lookout. And the other one 
was like pulling stuff out. 
Q Did you see where they were putting things? 
A They were putting them in a truck. 
Q What color was the truck? 
A It was like an older truck. It was like a faded 
greenish color. 
Q All right. Calling your attention to what has been 
marked Statefs Proposed Exhibit number 6, does that look like 
the truck? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Now at the--did you ever see, while you were 
there, the truck drive away? 
A No. 
Q All right. Where was the truck parked? 
A It was parked in--by one of the doors where you go 
inside the units, the small units. 
Q How many doors--if you have a unit in one of those 
doors, is that the only way you can get to your unit? 
A No, there is more. There is like two on the other 
side and two on that side, 
Q So you can get to all of the interior storage sheds 
through any of the doors? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that correct? 
9 
A Yes. 
Q All right. After you had seen them, lui' many 
storage sheds did you see them go through? 
A Two three. 
Q After \ : seen them go through these--were you 
actually in the building to see them doing that? 
A V wife. And we went to check on 
our unit. And my wife told me to get out and see, you know, 
because we had our units broken into too. So I went in to 
see, you know, because they were like suspicious. So I went 
in to go see what was going on just with the one that we 
owned. And there was like two or three that were already 
opened. 
Q You didn't see either of these two guys actually 
break into a shed? 
A No. 
Q Now other than the property in the sheds themselves, 
in th closets or the sheds or however large these are--and 
about how large are they, Mr. Solomon? 
A They are not that large. 
Q jive us some idea? 
A Probably as big as a bathroom. 
Q A bathroom? 
.-. A . Yeal i, ] i ke the normal bathroom. 
Q Okay. Other than the property in the open shed, the 
6 
three open sheds that you had seen--
A Uh-huh. 
Q Was there any other property scattered around in th^ 
hallways at that time? 
A I seen a couch pulled out, that was sort of halfway 
out. 
Q So the only property you saw, other than what was ir( 
the storage sheds, was a couch partially pulled out of a 
storage shed? 
A Yes. 
Q There wasn!t a lot of other property loose in the 
area? 
A No. 
Q All right. Would you remember what the couch lookec| 
like if you were to see it? 
A No. It was dark? 
A It was dark? 
A In the units there. 
Q Did those people see you? 
A Yeah, one of them seen me. And he was just like 
looking out, you know. 
Q And you could see them? 
A Yeah. 
Q Now, did you see them well enough to recognize them 





























Q Do you see either of the two individuals JI ».u« 
today? 
' A 
Which--where is that person? 
A He is sitting right here. 
MR D,A INESr All right. 1 lay the record show the 
Defendant has been identified by the witness, your Honor? 
THE COURT: It may so indicate. 
Q Which t tic two individuals was he? Was he the one| 
by the truck or the one that— 
A No, he was the one that was putting stuff in the 
truck. The other one was looking out. 
Q Was looking out? 
A Yeah. And he kept coming out of the little units 
and looking. He would pop back in. 
suspicious, me and my wife. 
Q All right. Did you call the police? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, how long have you rented at Mollerup? 
A F o r a b O U L a yea' 
Q During the peric. .. r time tl lat y o u, 1 la * e r ented 
there, have you become acquainted with Mollerup's procedures 
whei I s smebod? .« :i s overdue on the r ent, or abandoned the shed? 
A Yes. 
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Q What does Mollerup do to those sheds? 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, may I voir dire the witness?] 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. GRAVIS: How are you familiar with those 
procedures? 
A Because we have--we are overdue on our unit. When 
you are overdue on a unit, they put a lock on it. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay. So you know what happens when yoi^  
are overdue? 
A Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Daines) They put a lock on it? 
A Yes. 
Q So the Jury understands, once you are overdue, if 
they are going to move you out of the unit or if you--they 
actually--your lock is already on it? 
A Yes. 
Q And then an extra Mollerup lock goes on there? 
A Yes. 
Q That's what your experience has been there? 
A Yes. 
Q And yet the units that you saw the Defendant going 
through were not locked? 
A No. 
Q Do you know the numbers of any of the units that you| 
saw them going through? 
A No. 
Q All right But you did see a couch pulled partway 
out? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you see either the Defendant or the other persorj 
by the couch when you saw them? 
A Yes, they were just going througn and coming out of 
the little one and going back out, you know. 
Q Okay. see by couch? 
A I seen the other guy. 
Q The other guy? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Now did you then call the police? 
A Yes. We first got the license plate number off the 
truck. 
Q All right. 
A And we pulled out and parked by the main office, 
which is on the other side of the fence. And I goi - . 11> 
wife stayed in the car, locked the doors, t<i> make sure they 
didn't leave. If they left, you know, she would let me know. 
I went through a fie. larmon• . 
Q Did a police officer arrive? 
A • ' Yes. 
Q Di d you give the police officer the information that] 
you have just told the Jury? 
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A Yes. 
Q After you gave him that information, what did the 
officer ask you to do? 
A They asked us to wait on the other side of the 
fence. 
Q Did you ever see these people again? 
A No. 
Q Do you remember, Mr. Le Doux, how much property was 
in the back of the green pickup? 
It was full. 
Full? 
That's right. 
Did you see anybody actually put property in the 
the green truck? 
I seen a person put some up on top of the truck. 
On top of a truck? 
Yeah, on top of the camper? 
Okay. You didn't see the rest of it go in? 
No. 
All right. Was it already there when you arrived? 
Yes. 
MR. DAINES: Nothing further. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis. 






























BY MR. GRA\ . 
Q Okay, Mr. Le Doux, this truck was already there wher] 
you arrived? 
A Yes. ' .' 
Q And what time did you arrive? 
A Probably like around 6:00, 6:30, between there. 
Q And you went to your storage shed outside first, is 
that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you do in your storage shed outside? 
A Make sure that it wasn't opened. Because we went--
whe. ...ad our first storage sheci broke into, they didn't let) 
us know that it was broken into. So we just had to go and it 
was opened and everything was taken out. 
Q • When d:i i that occur? • 
A Probably a week after that? 
Q That occurred a week prior to this? 
A Yes. 
Q So you had had a storage shed broken into? 
A Yes. 
Q Was it in Mollerup? 
A It was It was the same. 
Q Okay. So you checked your outside storage unit. 
How long did that take? 
A We just passed by to make sure the lock was still onj 
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it. 
Q Okay. Then you stopped and actually went in and 
checked your inside one? 
A See, that's the thing, we--we--when they first were 
broken into, they didn't clean it out. The people that owned 
Mollerup, they didn't let us know that our unit was broken 
into. So my wife told me to get out and see if stuff was 
still in there, what was left, like a bunch of papers, albums 
you know 
Q So you went in? 
A So I just went in. My wife told me to go in and see) 
what was going on. 
Q So you went in and checked yourself? How long were 
you inside there? 
A Probably like two minutes. 
Q Okay. So how long--then you left and went to 
Harmon's, is that correct? 
A I went to the outside and parked by the main office. 
Q Okay. Then you went to Harmon's. From the time you| 
initially saw the truck until the police officer arrived, how 
much time had passed? 
A I'd say like 15 minutes. 
Q Okay. These people had seen you when you went in 
and checked the unit? 
A Yes. 
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Q Did you talk to them? 
No. 
Bi it 1 i :: c ] o s e ::i :i • ::i } • :: i i :: : n: i = t :: them? 
The little unit is right next to ours. The ones 
that are outside, it is right across the street from our 
storage unit. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay 1 have nothing further. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DAINES: 
Q Mr. Le Doux, did you ever say to either one of them 
I going f u go I'MU the police? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever say to either one of them do you belong) 
in these units? 
A No. 
Q Did you have any conversation with them? 
A No. 
Q So there was no apparent reason why they should pay 
any attention to you? 
A No. 
Q Now, you are acquainted with Mollerup? You have 
testified that there are garages, standard storage garages in 
the interior portion wi I li I I IH tiht> ly , 1 «., t l u i r .1 M MI i t y 
around this entire thing of some kind? The entire--all of the] 
storage sheds. 
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A A fence. 
Q How do you get through the fence? 
A You have got to punch in a code, and the fence open^ 
up. 
Q In order to get access to Mollerup, you have to hav^ 
a code? 
A You have to have a code. 
Q Who has the code in order to get in? 
A The people that own the storage sheds. 
MR. DAINES: Okay, thank you. I have nothing 
further, Mr. Gravis. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q So you have got to have a code to get in. If you 
take your stuff out of Mollerup do they change the code after 
you take your stuff out? 
A Yes, they should. I don't know. We haven't taken 
our stuff out. But that's the way it usually is, I guess. 
Q So they have got a different code for everybody? 
A Yes, they got a different code for everyone. 
Q Okay. Now, was there anybody else in Mollerup when 
you pulled in there? 
A There was a lady that rents right next to ours that 
was there. 
Q Okay. Anyone else? 
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A No. 
Q Was she there when you got there? 
A Yes. 
Q Wrtlfi f'il'lM'1 1 I"!*'1 1 *'* 1 ' 'tlf-MI "/OH! | P f t "? 
A Yes. 
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further. 
• . 1 1R DAINES : Notl lii ig f ill t :her , } :: m He >i lor. ' ' ' 
THE COURT: You may stand down. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, we are going to take the lunch 
break at this time. could have } : i i back here, we \ :i ] 3 
commence at 1:30, if you will be back at that time. If you 
get here early and want to go back into the Jury room, the 
Bailiff — locate the Bailiff.. The Bailiff will help you do 
that. 
Again I remind you, don't--you just heard opening 
statements and the testimony of one witness. Don't make up 
your mind about what happened until you hear all of the 
evidence I> :: i i"' t: discuss the case wi th anyone . A i i :i we will 
see you back here at 1:30. 
Court will be in recess. 
(Noon i ecess takei :i ) 
THE COURT: This is the case of State vs. Dittmer 
The record will indicate the parties are present, the members 
present. ML 
witness. 
(State of Utah vs. Michael Dittmer Case called. Jury 
selected and sworn. Preliminary Ins;i . - . . 
Opening statement by Mr. Daines. Opening reserved by Mr. 
Gravis.) 
THE COURT all _. . ..:• f >*: witness. 
MP DAINES: Thank you, your Honor. We would call 
Mr. Solomon Le Doux to the stand. 
SOLOMON LE DOUX 
called a, s a , :i t:i ie, =;s and having been first duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR DAINES: 
Q State your name, please, sir. 
A My name is Solomon Le Doux. 
Q Mr. Le Doux, calling your dLtention 2 9th of 
March, 1997, did you have a storage shed that you rented at 
that time? 
Yes. 
Where was the storage shed rented- -I mean located? 
The trailer was 103 and * was an out side one. 
Okay. Is that the < : • i i] y .
 t 1 ia<:! at: 11 i, • 11 i : i m e ? 
N o , w e h a d •.-•• o f t h e m . 
Where was tat; other one located? • 















Q So what you have is a standard looking out storage 
shed, and then on the inside, smaller ones that are in a 
building? 
A Yes. 
Q What kind of doors do the inside storage sheds have?) 
A They got like sliding doors. They just lift up. 
Q And can you lock them? 
A Yes. 
Q Where does the lock go on the storage shed doors? 
A They got like a little latch where it latches up anc| 
it goes into the wall. 
Q Okay. So on the 29th, you had two storage sheds 
there and you rented from Mollerup? 
A Yes. 
Q When you were at Mollerup did you see anything 
unusual going on on the premises? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you see? 
A I seen two men that were--one of them was like 
suspicious. He was anxious and he kept looking out. He was 
there inside the small ones. And they were going through the 
storage units. Like I seen them go through like two or three 
of them. 
Q All right. What were they doing after they would gc| 
through the storage units? 
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A " was like a 1 • :>okoi it. And the other one 
was like pulling stuff out. 
Q Did \- see where they were putting things? 
A T.. . -." k. 
Q What color was the truck? 
A It was like an older truck. It was like a faded 
greenish color. 
Q All right. Calling your attention to what has been 
marked State's Proposed Exhibit number 6, does that look like 
the truck? 
A Yes. 
Q Oka:;, Now at the--did you ever see, while you were 
there, the truck drive away? 
A No. 
Q All right: Where was the truck parked? 
A It was parked in--by one of the doors where you go 
inside the units, the small units. 
Q • H c •> w in a i" i. y d o o r s - - i f } r o i i 1 I ai; e a i 11 :i :ii t: :i i i • : n e of those 
doors, is that the only way you can get to your unit? 
A No, there is more. There is like two on the other 
side c .hat side. 
Q So you can get to all of the interior storage sheds 
through any of the doors? 
A 
Q Is that correct? 
g 
A Yes. 
Q All right. After you had seen them, how many 
storage sheds did you see them go through? 
A Two or three. 
Q After you had seen them go through these--were you 
actually in the building to see them doing that? 
A Well, I was with my wife. And we went to check on 
our unit. And my wife told me to get out and see, you know, 
because we had our units broken into too. So I went in to 
see, you know, because they were like suspicious. So I went 
in to go see what was going on just with the one that we 
owned. And there was like two or three that were already 
opened. 
Q You didn't see either of these two guys actually 
break into a shed? 
A No. 
Q Now other than the property in the sheds themselves, 
in the closets or the sheds or however large these are--and 
about how large are they, Mr. Solomon? 
A They are not that large. 
Q Can you give us some idea? 
A Probably as big as a bathroom. 
Q A bathroom? 
A Yeah, like the normal bathroom. 
Q Okay. Other than the property in the open shed, the! 
three open sheds that you had seen--
A Uh-huh. 
Q Was there any other property scattered around in th^ 
hallways at that time? 
A I seen a couch pul^ea out, that was sort of halfway 
out. 
Q \ property you saw, other than what was ir} 
the storage sheds, was a couch partially pulled out of a 
storage shed? 
'.A-.'... Y < -
Q There wasn't a lot of other property loose in the 
area? 
A No. 
Q All right. Would you remember what the couch lookedj 
like if you were to see it? 
A No. It was dark? 
A It was dark? 
A In the units there. 
Q Did those people see you? 
A Yeah, one of them seen me And he was just like 
ooking rou know. 
Q. <,. . you c^nld PPP Miem? 
A Yeah. 
Q ' enough t :> recognize them 
if you were to see them again? 
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A Yes, 
Q Do you see either of the two individuals in court 
today? 
A Yes. 
Q Which--where is that person? 
A He is sitting right here. 
MR. DAINES: All right. May the record show the 
Defendant has been identified by the witness, your Honor? 
THE COURT: It may so indicate. 
Q Which of the two individuals was he? Was he the one) 
by the truck or the one that--
A No, he was the one that was putting stuff in the 
truck. The other one was looking out. 
Q Was looking out? 
A Yeah. And he kept coming out of the little units 
and looking. He would pop back in. So that's how come we got) 
suspicious, me and my wife. 
Q All right. Did you call the police? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, how long have you rented at Mollerup? 
A For about a year. 
Q During the period of time that you have rented 
there, have you become acquainted with Mollerup's procedures 
when somebody is overdue on the rent, or abandoned the shed? 
A Yes. 
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Q What does Mollerup do to those sheds? 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, may I voir dire the witness? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. GRAVIS: How are you familiar with those 
procedures? 
A Because we have--we are overdue on our unit. When 
you are overdue on a unit, they put a lock on it. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay. So you know what happens when yo\-| 
are overdue? 
A Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Dames) They put a lock on it? 
A Yes. 
Q So the Jury understands, once you are overdue, if 
they are going to move you out of the unit or if you--they 
actually--your lock is already on it? 
A Yes. 
Q And then an extra Mollerup lock goes on there? 
A Yes. 
Q That's what your experience has been there? 
A Yes. 
Q And yet the units that you saw the Defendant going 
through were not locked? 
A No. 
Q Do you know the numbers of any of the units that you[ 
saw them going through? 
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A No. 
Q All right. But you did see a couch pulled partway 
out? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you see either the Defendant or the other persorj 
by the couch when you saw them? 
A Yes, they were just going through 'and coming out of 
the little one and going back out, you know. 
Q Okay. Who did you see by the couch? 
A I seen the other guy. 
Q The other guy? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Now did you then call the police? 
A Yes. We first got the license plate number off the 
truck. 
Q All right. 
A And we pulled out and parked by the main office, 
which is on the other side of the fence. And I got out. My 
wife stayed in the car, locked the doors, to make sure they 
didn't leave. If they left, you know, she would let me know. 
I went through a field to Harmon's and called the cops. 
Q Did a police officer arrive? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you give the police officer the information that] 
you have just told the Jury? 
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A Yes. 
Q After you gave him that information, what did the 
officer ask you to do? 
A They asked us to wait on the other side of the 
fence. 
Q Did you ever see these people again? 
A No. 
Q Do you remember, Mr. Le Doux, how much property was 
in the back of the green pickup? 
A It was full. 
Q Full? 
A Thatfs right. 
Q Did you see anybody actually put property in the 
back of the green truck? 
A I seen a person put some up on top of the truck. 
Q On top of a truck? 
A Yeah, on top of the camper? 
Q Okay. You didn't see the rest of it go in? 
A No. 
Q All right. Was it already there when you arrived? 
A Yes. 
MR. DAINES: Nothing further. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis. 
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
13J 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q Okay, Mr. Le Doux, this truck was already there wher 
you arrived? 
Yes. 
And what time did you arrive? 
Probably like around 6:00, 6:30, between there. 
And you went to your storage shed outside first, is 
that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you do in your storage shed outside? 
A Make sure that it wasn't opened. Because we went--
when we had our first storage shed broke into, they didn't let 
us know that it was broken into. So we just had to go and it 
was opened and everything was taken out. 
When did that occur? 
Probably a week after that? 
That occurred a week prior to this? 
Yes. 
So you had had a storage shed broken into? 
Yes. 
Was it in Mollerup? 
It was. It was the same. 
Okay. So you checked your outside storage unit. 
How long did that take? 





























Q Okay. Then you stopped and actually went in and 
checked your inside one? 
A See, that!s the thing, we--we--when they first were 
broken into, they didn't clean it out. The people that owned 
Mollerup, they didn't let us know that our unit was broken 
into. So my wife told me to get out and see if stuff was 
still in there, what was left, like a bunch of papers, albums 
you know 
Q So you went in? 
A So I just went in. My wife told me to go in and see) 
what was going on. 
Q So you went in and checked yourself? How long were 
you inside there? 
A Probably like two minutes. 
Q Okay. So how long--then you left and went to 
Harmon's, is that correct? 
A I went to the outside and parked by the main office 
Q Okay. Then you went to Harmon's. From the time you| 
initially saw the truck until the police officer arrived, how 
much time had passed? 
A I'd say like 15 minutes. 
Q Okay. These people had seen you when you went in 
and checked the unit? 
A Yes. 
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Q Did you talk to them? 
A No. 
Q But how close did you come to them? 
A The little unit is right next to ours. The ones 
that are outside, it is right across the street from our 
storage unit. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay. I have nothing further. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DAINES: 
Q Mr. Le Doux, did you ever say to either one of them 
I am going to go call the police? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever say to either one of them do you belongj 
in these units? 
A No. 
Q Did you have any conversation with them? 
A No. 
Q So there was no apparent reason why they should pay 
any attention to you? 
A No. 
Q Now, you are acquainted with Mollerup? You have 
testified that there are garages, standard storage garages in 
the interior portion with the sheds. Is there a security 
around this entire thing of some kind? The entire--all of the) 
storage sheds. 
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A A fence. 
Q How do you get through the fence? 
A You have got to punch in a code, and the fence open^ 
up. 
Q In order to get access to Mollerup, you have to hav^ 
a code? 
A You have to have a code. 
Q Who has the code in order to get in? 
A The people that own the storage sheds. 
MR. DAINES: Okay, thank you. I have nothing 
further, Mr. Gravis. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q So you have got to have a code to get in. If you 
take your stuff out of Mollerup do they change the code after 
you take your stuff out? 
A Yes, they should. I don!t know. We haven't taken 
our stuff out. But that's the way it usually is, I guess. 
Q So they have got a different code for everybody? 
A Yes, they got a different code for everyone. 
Q Okay. Now, was there anybody else in Mollerup when 
you pulled in there? 
A There was a lady that rents right next to ours that 
was there. 
Q Okay. Anyone else? 
151 
A No. 
Q Was she there when you got there? 
A Yes. 
Q Was she there when you left? 
A Yes. 
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further. 
MR. DAINES: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may stand down. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, we are going to take the lunch 
break at this time. If we could have you back here, we will 
commence at 1:30, if you will be back at that time. If you 
get here early and want to go back into the Jury room, the 
Bailiff--locate the Bailiff. The Bailiff will help you do 
that. 
Again I remind you, don't--you just heard opening 
statements and the testimony of one witness. Don't make up 
your mind about what happened until you hear all of the 
evidence. Don't discuss the case with anyone. And we will 
see you back here at 1:30. 
Court will be in recess. 
(Noon recess taken.) 
THE COURT: This is the case of State vs. Dittmer. 
The record will indicate the parties are present, the members 































Detective Anita Bryson to the stand. 
THE COURT: Thank you. If you would come forward, 
please. 
ANITA BRYSON 
called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DAINES. 
Q State your name and occupation, please. 
A I am Anita Bryson. I am a Detective with the Roy 
Police Department. 
Q How long have you been a detective with the Roy-
Police Department? 
A About a year. 
Q How long have you been a police officer with the Roy( 
City Police Department? 
A A little better than eleven years. 
Q On the 29th of March, 1997, in what division were 
you assigned? 
A The Detective Division. 
Q Did you have any specific jobs in the Detective 
Division? 
A Yes, I primarily investigate property crimes. 
Q And did you get a call on the 29th of March, 1997, 
at about 6:30 to come to work? 
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A Yes, I did. 
Q Were you working that day? 
A No. 
Q You were the on call detective? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q Where did you go? 
A I was asked to go to Mollerup, or Security Mini 
Storage. 
Q And what do you call it? 
A I call it Mollerup. 
Q All right. But we are talking about the same place 
here? 
A Yes, that's true. 
Q The address is what, please? 
A 1701 West Riverdale Road, Roy. 
Q When you arrived were there any other officers from 
your department there? 
A Yes. I met Detective--excuse me, Sgt. Stephens and 
Officer Hackworth. 
Q Now what was your primary position at the time that 
you arrived? What were you going to be doing that night? 
A I was there to assist Officer Hackworth with his 
investigation, and to interview, if it needed to be done, any 
suspects. 



























A Thatf s correct. 
Q And--all right. And did you interview--two people 
were arrested there that day, is that correct? 
A Thatf s correct. 
Q Did you interview either one of them? 
A Yes, I did. I interviewed both. 
Q Okay. And in what order did you interview these 
people? 
A I initially ordered--excuse me, interviewed Robert 
Amador. And then I interviewed Michael Dittmer. 
Q All right. And did you take a statement from Robert) 
Amador? 
MR. GRAVIS: Objection, your Honor, it is irrelevant 
THE COURT: You can answer yes or no. 
MR. DAINES: That's all I am asking. 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Okay. Was that before or after the one you took 
from Dittmer? 
A Before. 
Q Did you then take a statement from the Defendant? 
A Yes. 
Q Prior to the time that you took a statement, did you| 
advise him of his rights under the Miranda decision? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did you do so from memory, or from a card that you 
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carry? 
A Well, when I do an interview in my office, I have a 
card taped to my computer monitor that I read directly from, 
which is right near where they sit. 
Q Did you--is that a proper rendition of Miranda? 
A Yes, it comes from the State law. 
Q Did you give those warnings to the Defendant? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Can you now tell the Jury what warnings you gave 
him? 
A You wish me to read the entire warning? 
Q Do you have them with you? 
A No. 
Q Well, I wish you to go over the warnings you gave 
him. 
A I advised him he had the right to remain silent. If| 
he gave up the right to remain silent, anything he said could 
and would be used against him in a court of law. That he has 
a right to an attorney and have an attorney present with him 
before questioning if he wished one. If he decided to answer 
questions without having counsel present, he could stop 
answering questions at any time or request an attorney at any 
time. And then I asked if he understood the questions. 
Q What was his response? 
































Q Did you ask him having those rights in mind would hq 
be willing to speak to you 
A Yes. He agreed. 
Q He agreed? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you then question him? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Where did you question him? 
A In my office. 
Q And that's at the Roy Police? 
A Thatf s correct. 
Q Was there anyone present at the time that you 
questioned him? 
A No, there was not. 
Q All right. At the time that you questioned him, did( 
he tell you if he had been at Mollerup earlier in the day? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q When did he tell you he had been there? 
A He told me that he had been there at 9:30 or 10:00 
ofclock in the morning that morning. 
Q All right. Did he indicate what, if anything, he 
saw there? 
A He said that in the afternoon he told Mr. Amador 
that he had seen a couch at Mollerup. And that--and suggested] 
to him that they go to Mollerup and get it. 
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Q Did he tell you what they did after they got the 
couch? 
A He said that after they got the couch they looked 
through other storage sheds that were not locked for other 
property. 
Q That were not locked? 
A That's correct• 
Q That was his criteria for getting property? 
A Yes. 
Q Any shed that wasn't locked? 
A That's correct. 
Q All right. Did he indicate whether anybody came by 
while he was there? 
A Yes, he did. He said that the manager of Mollerup 
had come by and had looked in and did see him. 
Q Did you verify that through your own investigation 
if the manager from Mollerup had come by? 
A I verified he had been there at the scene. I don't 
know if he had been there prior to the police being there. 
Q Okay. He was there when the police were there? 
A Yes, that's right. 
Q All right. What did he say about the stuff that he 
had entered or put in his truck? Did he tell you what he 
thought it was? 
A He thought that most of it was--he said he thought 
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it was garbage. It was just going to be going in the garbage.] 
Stuff going in the garbage. 
Q Did you see the stuff in the truck? 
A I did. 
Q Did you see the things in the partially opened shed 
of Ms. Ayers? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did that look like garbage headed to the garbage 
heap? 
A No, it did not. 
Q Were you present when he opened his shed? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Did you see what was in his shed? 
A I did. 
Q What was in there? 
A A blue camper shell, a white washing machine, and 
there were some other objects in there. 
Q Did you look at the washing machine? 
A I did. 
Q What can you tell the Jury about the washing 
machine? 
A It was very clean. There was no scratches on the 
machine. I know my own washing machine at home is not very 
old, works pretty well, and it doesn't look that good. 



























A No, I didn't. 
Q All right. Did you have any idea who that belonged 
to at that time? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you subsequently learn who that washing machine 
belonged to? 
A I did. 
Q How long after the 29th of March was it before--
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am going to object to 
this. This is irrelevant who the washing machine belongs to 
and when she discovered it is irrelevant. He is not charged 
with theft of a washing machine. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know what he is charged 
with theft of. 
MR. DAINES: No, he is not charged with the theft of 
the washing machine. It is not in there, your Honor. He is 
not charged with that. 
THE COURT: Tell me the relevance. 
MR. DAINES: The relevance of asking about the 
washing machine? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. DAINES: Because he said that to her in his 
statement, that the material was junk. 
THE COURT: And you are talking about--
MR. DAINES: It looked to him as if it was going to 
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the garbage. And I am asking her if it looked to her like it 
was going to the garbage. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
Q All right. Did you--after he told you that that 
stuff was going to the garbage did you specifically ask him 
about that washing machine? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Why did you pick the washing machine? 
A It looked to be more--one of the more valuable or 
newer items. I also didn't know who it belonged to at that 
point. 
Q What did he tell you about the washing machine? 
A I asked him if he honestly thought that washing 
machine was going in the garbage. And he said no. He himself] 
said in his heart he knew it was wrong to take it and that he 
should return it. 
Q Okay. Did you ask him about any of the other 
property, other than the washing machine? 
A Specificly items, I don't recall asking him, no. 
Q Okay. And was that basically the total of the 
conversation that you had with him at that time? 
A Basically, yes. 
MR. DAINES: Okay. I have no further questions. 




























BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q Now when you questioned him, you are aware that 
Lynnette Talbot had indicated that she and another individual 
would come and clean out abandoned storage sheds, correct? 
A I think I was aware that she did that at that time. 
But I am not positive whether it was before or after the 
interview. 
Q Okay. And that she specifically would buy the item^ 
that were left in the storage shed, correct? 
A I am not sure I understand. 
Q That she--her statement earlier to Officer--I 
believe it was Officer Hackworth. 
MR. DAINES: Whose statement are we talking about? 
MR. GRAVIS: Lynnette Talbot's. 
MR. DAINES: I object to that as being hearsay, your 
Honor. 
MR. GRAVIS: Well, your Honor, Mr. Daines has put in 
lots of hearsay of Ms. Talbot. I was of the understanding she) 
was going to testify. 
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, there was no indication of 
that. And I am going to object. That's not an answer to a 
hearsay objection. 
MR. GRAVIS: Well, your Honor, I am not--she said she) 
was conducting the interview. I am asking what she was aware 
of when she conducted the interview. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Set up the question again. Will 
you do that? 
Q Okay. When you questioned him, were you aware she 
had indicated--
THE COURT: When you questioned--
MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Dittmer. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q Were you aware Ms. Talbot indicated that she would 
clean out abandoned storage sheds and buy the items left ther^ 
from the owner? 
A I was never aware that she bought them. I was told 
that she was given them--
Q Okay, or given them. 
A Or give the items away. She never bought them. 
Q Mr. Dittmer always indicated the storage sheds were 
open when he got there, right? 
A Yes. 
Q Were you aware that there were previous burglaries 
at that Mollerup storage area that week prior? 
A I knew there were some previous ones. I didn't 
know--
Q Okay. You don't know anything about previous ones? 
A Exactly how previous. There have been others there, 
yes. 
Q Okay. Now when you talked to him, he indicated--
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always indicated that these storage sheds were already opened,] 
that he didn't break into them, correct? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And that he thought the property had been abandoned 
because they were wide open? 
A I don't know whether he is indicating that he think^ 
the property is abandoned. He is telling me that he finds 
sheds that are open. And that he thinks that they must be 
going to go to the garbage. And that's when I asked him do 
you really think that stuff is going to the garbage. 
Q That he thought the stuff was going to the garbage? 
A Yeah. That's how that came up. 
Q Because this was wide open? 
A Because the sheds were open. 
Q Okay. Now as far as the washing machine goes, you 
don't know whether that was in working condition, though, 
right? 
A I don't. 
Q You just looked at the outside of it. Did you go up] 
and closely examine it? 
A No. 
Q So it may have been junk after all, as far as you 
know? 
A As far as I know. 



























A I did try to look behind it, and I didn't--it felt 
heavy enough it probably had a motor. I would guess it did. 
But I didn't examine it for a motor. 
Q Okay. Now did you--when you went through his right^ 
with him, and you recited them in court. I didnft hear you 
bring up the part about advising him of his right to have an 
attorney appointed if he could not afford one. 
A I may have missed it today. I am sure--I am a 
hundred percent positive it is on the card I read to him. 
Q You did read it from a card? 
A Yes, I did. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay. I have nothing further. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DAINES: 
Q When Mr. Gravis characterizes the sheds and says--as| 
wide open, has he been saying the sheds were wide open or 
unlocked? 
A Unlocked. 
MR. DAINES: Thank you. Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis. 
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down, thank you. Mr. 
Daines. 
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, at this time the State would) 




























IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
-vs-
MICHAEL RENE DITTMER 
Defendant 
Case No. 971900432 
TRANCRIPT ON APPEAL 
VOLUME II of II 
APR 1 0 19SA 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter came on 
for hearing before the Hon. PARLEY R. BALDWIN, Judge of the 
above entitled Court on November 24, 1997. 
WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had and the 
following testimony was adduced, to wit: 
A p p e a r a n c e g: 
WILLIAM DAINES, ESQ., 
Attorney for Plaintiff; 
MARTIN GRAVIS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant. 
FILED 
APR 1 7 1998 






















MR. DAINES: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, this 
is the time that the State has the opportunity to give an 
opening statement. Before I actually get into the facts of 
the case, I should caution you on a few things about Jury 
trials, for those of you who have never been in one before. 
For those who have, you probably already know this, hopefully 
And I wish I would have said this before they were excluded a^ 
witnesses. Hopefully the witnesses that the State have as 
witnesses will avoid you like the plague during the course of 
this trial, in the elevators and the street, at lunch time. 
Many of the restaurants are quite close to the courthouse, so 
you might see somebody walk in the door and turn around and 
walk back out if they see you sitting there. 
That isn't because they don't like you. It is simply 
because they can't have any contact with Jurors, shouldn't 
have any contact with Jurors. Most people who have at least 
been through this process try to avoid at least the appearance) 
of some improper contact with Jurors. It is not that they 
don't like you. It is what they should be doing. And 
probably you should be doing the same thing if you see them 
after they have been introduced. 
The State has the opportunity to give you an opening 
statement. As Judge Baldwin has instructed you, the defense 
may or may not give an opening statement. Nobody has to give 



























At the end of the trial, I will be given the opportunity 
to provide what is called a summation. The defense here agair} 
will also have the right to provide a summation. After the 
defense has gone through their summation, I get a rebuttal. 
After I finish with the rebuttal, the defense doesn't get to 
talk any more. Now, the reason for that is, as Judge Baldwin 
has instructed you, the burden of proof is on the State. And 
for that reason, the party with the burden of proof in the lav} 
suit always speaks last. That's the reason for that. We are 
not taking unfair advantage of anybody. We have the burden o£| 
proof, and that's the way--that's why it goes that way. 
On the 25th of March, 1997, a young woman by the name of 
Nicole Ayers had visited her storage unit. Her storage unit 
was number 552 in an establishment known as Mollerup Storage 
at 1701 West Riverdale Road in Riverdale. This, for those of 
you who don't know about this place, and perhaps none of you 
do, I didn't, is the standard type of storage area with the 
bay garages that you can pull a car or boat or something like 
that into. 
It also has a large building that has hallways with 
interior storage, storage--smaller storage rooms that also 
have garage types of doors in them. And it is into this--and 
the Judge will instruct you that breaking into a building, or 
any portion of a building, is burglary. And this is a portioi^ 
of a building. 
The Defendant, on the--during this period of time had 
access to that building because he had a storage locker in 
there like Nicole Ayers did. So the unlawful entry is not 
into the building. The unlawful entry is into the portion of 
the building which was controlled on the 25th and 29th of 
March by Nicole Ayers, and had been locked by her at that 
time. 
She is not certain exactly why she was there now on the 
25th of March. She was not living in her own home. She was 
living with a relative. So all of her worldly belongings, her) 
furniture and appliances and books and teddy bears and things 
like that that she had collected were in this storage shed. 
And she also had some clothes there. I think her best 
recollection is I might have been there on the 25th of March 
in order to pick up some clothes. 
She was keeping a key lock on the storage shed. And she 
went in there on the 25th of March. She unlocked the key. 
She got in there. She did whatever business she had to do, 
and she noticed that all of her things were intact. Nothing 
was missing from her storage shed on the 25th of March, 1997. 
When she left, she was very careful to put her key lock 
on the shed, check it to make sure that her shed in the 
interior part of the building of Mollerup Storage was secure. 
Her testimony will be in fact it was secure. I am very 
careful about locking those things up, and I am sure I locked 
it on that day. She then left and went about her business. 
Nicole Ayers did not know this Defendant, who is seated 
here at counsel table. 
On the 29th of March at about 5:45, or even earlier in 
the evening, a gentleman by the name of Solomon Le Doux, who 
was also a renter at Mollerup Storage, had gone to Mollerup 
Storage. While he was there, he noticed that on the east sid^ 
of the storage rows inside the building there were two guys 
who had parked an old green pickup truck outside of one of thej 
doors, who were going into various sheds taking property and 
putting it in the truck. 
Mr. Le Doux did--they appeared to be taking property fronj 
people that these people have no right to, so he immediately 
called the police. At about 6:00 p.m. Officer Stuart 
Hackworth arrived, dispatched in response to Mr. Le Doux's 
call. Officer Hackworth is a young officer who was assigned 
to the patrol division at that time. And he was in uniform 
and in a marked car of the Roy City Police Department. 
He contacted Mr. Le Doux. Mr. Le Doux said they are 
around there on the other side. Officer Hackworth then asked 
Mr. Le Doux, don't approach the area, you stay here and I will 
go see whatfs going on. Officer Hackworth then approached, 
here again in the evening hours. It is still light. This is 
the 29th of March. And when he went around the corner, he 
found this Defendant standing by a pickup truck that was 
completely loaded with property, and had a couch strapped on 
the top of it. 
He walked over to this person and said is this your truck 
to the Defendant. The Defendant said yes, it is. And he said 
what's your name to the Defendant. And the Defendant, who yoij 
know by Michael Dittmer obviously from Judge Baldwin's having 
read the Information, told him at this time my name is Mike 
Bradshaw. Officer Hackworth said what is your birth date? 
And the Defendant said 4/10/64, April 10, 1964. In fact his 
birth date is April 10, 1961. 
At that time, because he had been told by Mr. Le Doux 
that more than one person was there, and he could only see the) 
Defendant, he said do you have somebody else here with you? 
He is in the storage shed. The truck is parked outside one o^ 
the two doors on the side of the building that you can see in 
the photo that leads down to these rows of storage sheds. Ancj 
it is parked outside of one of those rows. 
Is there anybody in there? Yeah, there is. Who is in 
there? Robert, Robert Amador. He is in the shed. Hackworth 
said what are you doing here? And he said we are going 
through unlocked sheds and taking the property of people to 
sell at the swap meet. But they are unlocked sheds that we 
are going through. Hackworth said okay, do you have a shed in) 
this place? And at this time he said yes, I do. It is right 
in here. 
Now as you will see from a photograph and hear from the 
officers--he then took Hackworth into the building. There ar^ 
two doors. One door leads to the Defendant's shed. And he 
showed that to Hackworth. The other door is actually in a 
hallway where Nicole Ayers1 shed is. They are in two 
different hallways as I understand the setup there. He is 
outside the one for Nicole. He does tell the officer there i4 
a shed there, and he points it out to him. He says that's 
mine. 
The door is down at this time. And he volunteers no 
other information to the officer at this time, other than the 
fact that that's my shed. And like I say, his door is down, 
and they can't see anything. 
At this time Hackworth, because he is in the building, 
all of the sudden sees Amador with an armful of books poke his) 
head out of an open shed, and then poke right back in. At 
this time he says who is that? That's Amador. And he orders 
Amador to come out too. So Amador comes out of a shed within 
the building which is open. 
And he is then in there with both of these individuals, 
and has called for a backup, or at least knows that his 
dispatch knows where he is. And he is in kind of an empty 
area at this time. Remember, it is a Saturday evening. It isj 
getting along towards dark, and he has got two guys on his 
hands. So he has asked for a backup to come. And Sergeant 
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Dan Stephens is on his way at this time. 
Because he had been addressing the Defendant, Hackworth 
at this time said to the Defendant what have you guys found? 
Now, he has seen the truck. He has seen the truck full of 
property. He has noticed the couch strapped on top of the 
truck. At this time, though the question was directed at the 
Defendant, Amador answers. And Amador says--
MR. GRAVIS: I would object to whatever Amador says. 
Amador is not included as a witness by the State, and 
therefore any statements by Mr. Amador is clearly hearsay. 
MR. DAINES: No, they are not, your Honor. They are 
statements made in the presence of the Defendant at the time 
that--
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am--
MR. DAINES: Responding to the question. They are 
not hearsay. 
THE COURT: This is not--this is not evidence. I 
instruct you this is not evidence. I am going to allow you tc| 
proceed. 
MR. GRAVIS: May we approach the Bench first, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh, please. 
(Conference at Bench with Court and counsel.) 
MR. DAINES: At this time, though the question was 
directed at the Defendant, Amador answered and said a couch, al 
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camper shell and a washer. 
At or about this time Dan Stephens rolled in. And so 
that Dan Stephens is now present, along with Officer 
Hackworth, with these two people. 
After Robert has told them this--and by the way, the 
officers cannot see--they see the couch on top of the truck. 
They cannot see a camper shell. And they cannot see a washer 
at this point. 
At this time the Defendant was asked by one of the 
officers where did all those items in the back of your pickup 
truck come from, because all he has been told about right now 
is a camper shell, a washer and a couch. He hasn't been told 
about all of this property in the back of the truck. And at 
this time the Defendant responded that all of the items in the) 
back of his pickup came--belonged to him. That they had been 
there for, in his words at that time, a long time. 
At this point Amador, who was with them, standing right 
with the Defendant, he can hear what the Defendant said, he 
said that's right, those items belong to Dittmer, and they 
have been in there for days, is the terminology he used. 
And so right off the bat the officers are told that 
though the couch on the top of the truck might belong to 
someone else, the interior property, the things in the 
inside--the first statement the Defendant made to the 


























At this point a woman by the name of Lynette Talbot drovq 
up while the four of them were standing there. Came in there 
and said I am looking for a blue camper shell that had been 
given to me because I helped clean out some sheds here. And 
I can't see it anywhere. 
At this point Dan Stephens, who had been told that the 
Defendant had a shell in his storage shed, walked over to her, 
got a description, walked to the Defendant and said is it a 
blue camper shell that you have in your storage shed? At thi^ 
time the Defendant said would you like to see? And he said 
yes, we would. So they went over, and the Defendant opened 
his storage shed for the officers. Inside the storage shed 
was Lynette Talbot's blue camper shell, a washer, and one of 
the pieces of property--no, a washer and a camper shell. Ancj 
that was the only property in that storage shed. There was 
nothing else. 
The officers looked at the washer. The testimony will bej 
from them that it was quite a new appearing washer. It is not] 
something that looks like scrap material. 
At this time, because of the fact that property which 
they now know belongs to another person had been found in 
their possession, Hackworth goes to this Defendant and point 
blank says to him, is there any property in your truck that 
you have found around here that we should know about? And the) 
Defendant said here, after being asked by the officer about 
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the property in the back of the truck, I will open it for you 
So they went over to the truck, and he opened the truck. 
The first thing inside the truck was a box. And the box,] 
it is difficult to see in the exhibit, but Nicole Ayers will 
show you where her name is on the cardboard box. At this tim^ 
she was renting, like I say, shed number 552. 
Officer Stephens said the box lid was open. He simply 
reached in and found a day planner type of thing within the 
box. And looked in it, and there was Nicole Ayers' name and 
telephone number. 
Stephens looked at the Defendant and said did you find 
this around here? And the Defendant said yes. Detective--or 
Sgt. Stephens' statement will be this is the first time in hi^ 
presence that the Defendant has acknowledged that there is 
property in the back of that truck that doesn't belong to him. 
Previously he had said to Stephens all of that property in 
there is mine. 
So the police called the number. Had to call through an 
uncle, I believe. And finally reached Nicole Ayers at her 
place of work. And they said to her do you have a storage 
shed at Mollerup? Yes, I do, number 552. The officer looked 
at 552, and said your shed is open. Will you please come down| 
here and look at the property. So she came down. 
She arrived. The Defendant and Amador are still there. 
She looked at the couch on the roof and said that's my couch 
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on the roof of that pickup truck. That was in my shed that 
was locked a few days ago, the 25th of March, by my key. And 
that is my couch. 
So they said well, peek in the truck and see if you can 
see anything else in there. She looked in there, and she saw 
various items of her property in back of the truck, including 
a blue bed frame and some other articles which she will 
identify. 
She also noted, after having looked in her shed, that 
there were things missing from her shed that were neither in 
the shed nor in the truck at that time. 
She at that time--after she had identified property that 
the Defendant had previously said belonged to him, the 
officers arrested the Defendant. He was taken to the police 
department, and Detective Bryson, who was the detective callec| 
out on the case that Saturday night, who had been at the 
scene, she arrived after Stephens did, had actually been there) 
when they looked in the shed, spoke to the Defendant, after 
having given him his Miranda warnings, and said what were you 
doing there? The Defendant said, hey, we are just there 
cleaning out the sheds. The people abandoned the sheds. We 
didn't think that property was worth anything. It was all 
just going in the garbage anyway. And Officer Bryson said 
where are you getting this property? Well, we were going intc) 
the sheds, but the doors were unlocked. He admitted at this 
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time that he had gone into the sheds. She said come on, 
Dittmer, you have seen that washing machine in your shed. Did 
you really think they were going to throw that washing machinq 
away? And he said no, I don't think they were going to throw 
the washing machine away. I shouldn't have taken that. 
Now, at that time he knew that the police knew who the 
property belonged to in the back of the truck, and on top of 
the truck, that it belonged to Nicole Ayers. But she had no 
idea at the time who this washing machine belonged to. So sh^ 
used that as an example of come on, you don't think any of 
that is going out, do you? And he admitted no, maybe I 
should take that piece of property back. 
Before the Defendant was taken to the police department 
to speak to Detective Bryson, while he was still in 
Hackworth's car, patrol car, before he was transported, Sgt. 
Stephens and another officer who was there, and a CSI officer, 
a crime scene investigator, began doing an impound inventory 
of the truck that was parked there. On the seat in plain 
view, while he was doing the inventory, Officer Stephens--Sgt 
Stephens found what is known to him, based on twenty I think 
one years, or almost twenty years of experience as a police 
officer, something he would call a hype kit. And what that is) 
is equipment in a kit used to shoot up controlled substances. 
And he picked it up off the seat and held it up where the 
Defendant could see it. He was over in Hackworth's car. The 
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Defendant said that's mine. I have a drug problem. 
When he was searched after he was arrested by Officer 
Hackworth, Marijuana was found in his pants pocket. 
Those are the facts that comprise the four charges that 
are before you as the Jury today. 
Thank you for listening. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Daines. Mr. Gravis? 
MR. GRAVIS: Reserve opening statement, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Call your first witness. 
• •• 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
County of Weber ) 
I, James N. Jones, do hereby certify that I am one of thq 
Official Court Reporters for the State of Utah, and a 
competent machine shorthand writer. 
That on November 24, 1997, the foregoing entitled matter 
was recorded on videotape. That thereafter I reported in 
machine shorthand the proceedings had and testimony given in | 
the case on videotape entitled State of Utah vs. Michael Rene | 
Dittmer. ! 
That thereafter, I reduced my machine shorthand notes to 
typewriting, and the foregoing transcript, pages 1 through 14, 
inclusive, constitutes a full, true and correct transcript of 
the proceedings had at said time and place. 
In witness hereof I have hereunto set my hand this 1st 
day of April, 1997. 
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